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1 THE WARTIME CONCEPT
National income or net national product measures thecontribution
of the productive system to the basic purposeeconomic activity is
assumed to satisfy. In peacetime this purpose is to providefor the
population's needs; and the contribution of economicactivity is rep-
resented by: (a) flow of goods to ultimate consumers(consumers'
outlay); (b) net additions to stocks of goods that have not yet
reached consumers but are intended to be used, directly orindirectly,
to satisfy ultimate wants (net capitalformation)-National income
totals, however derived, equal the sum of these two components.
For short term changes it is often preferable tostudy gross rather
than net additions to fixed equipment and construction.To estimate
the turrent consumption of these durable capitalgoods, as we must
in order to pass from gross to net additions, is difficult and theresults
are subject to a wide margin of error. Inbusiness judgments the line
between net addition to durable equipment or constructionand re-
placement is tenuous. Hence, many studies of the nationalproduct,
especially those related to capital formation, use also a totalthat
differs from national income in that it includes gross rather than net
additions to durable equipment and construction.Designated gross
national product, it exceeds net national product or nationalincome
by the amount of current consumption (depreciation anddepletion)
of durable capital goods.
In a major war, economic activity has a second basic purpose: to
provide commodities and services for the armed conflict. It is not
realistic to treat this wnflid as a production or consumption process
subordinate to that of satisfying needs of ultimate consumers; noris
it valid to assume that even in an all-out war, civilianneeds become
completely subordinate to military (so that, for example, population
groups that cannot contribute to the war aredeprived of all economic
goods). Both basic purposes must be met and decisions concerning
the allocation of resources between the two depend chiefly uponfac-
tors outside the ordinary economic processes of themarket place. In
a nonmilitaristic country the emergenceof the armed conflict as a
new channel of final use, affecting alarge proportion of resources,
calls for a concept of national product that in essence is noncom-
parable with that of peacetime.1
The composition of this wartime concept of the nationalproduct




can be clearly seen by analogy with the peacetime. The armed conflict
as a channel of final use gives rise to a new category similar to the
flow of goods to consumersthe flow into the armed conflict,repre-
senting the value of equipment for and services of the armed forces.
So fax as new plants or construction units are built for the production
of munitions or the training of troops, the net addition shouldenter
the wartime concept of net national product and the gross addition,
gross national product. The wartime national income total then
includes four distinct components: (a) flow of goods toconsumers,
(b) net capital formation, nonwar, (c) how of finishedwar products,
(d) net additions to durable equipment and construction designed
specifically for the production of war products. Thegross natiGnal
product in wartime differs from the net total just described in thatit
includes gross rather than net tdditions to all durable equipuientand
construction, in both the nonwar and war sectors. In actual statistical
practice, however, components (c) and (d) are lumped undertotal
war outlay, either including or excluding depreciation on warcon-
struction.
2 TOTALS IN CURRENT PRICES
The estimates in Table 1 are merely approximationsto the national
product totals as defined above because the usable dataare not suf-
fluently detailed to measure accurately end-productcategories. The
2The concepts used here differ from those of the Department of Commercewhich have
wide currency. The Department's gross national productassumes that a/I government
expenditures represent anal products, whereas we retain the assumption adoptedin pre-
war estimates, viz., that taxes paid by business enterprises (exduding the rise caused by
the war) repreaent services by government to business and, therefore,intermediate rather
than final products. Consequently, the Department'sgross national product totals in
current prices are larger than ours.
Its national income totals are made up of incomepayments to individuals and net
savings of corporations after all tax payments. Our totals,on the source of payments
approach, would be approximated by income paymentsto individuals and corporate net
savings gross of the increase in corporate taxes inyears of war and of prewar defense
programs.
In formulating the concept of gross national productno good reason was seen for
modifying the assumption that some part ofgovernment services is an intermediate
rather than a llnal product; or for deviating from thesomewhat arbitrary but customary
assumption which measures these intermediate services bypeacetime payments of cor-
porate taxes. In defining national income or net national product,it was considered
indispensable to retain its meaning as thesum of all net finished output; i.e., in wartime
as the sum of ow to consumers, net nonwar capital formation, andnet war pcoduction.
On a payment level, this calls for the inclusion, in additionto corporate net savings, of
the increase in corporate taxes. Compensation of such productivefactors as is represented
by income payments is measured (by the Dep'rtmentalso) inclusive of the larger direct
tax payments; compensation of the factor of enterprise,represented by net corporate
savings, should likewise be measured inclusive of theincrease in corporate taxes.
2following comments serve to indicate the respects in which the esti-
mates fail to give what is wanted.
TABLE I
Derivation of National Product Totals, Wartime Concept, 1939-1943
Line 1: Survey of Curreni Bujinej.r, Aug. 1943, p. 13, Table 5, line 16, and p. 12,
Table 1, line 14.
Line 2: An average of direct personal taxes for 1936-38. Figures from Survey, May 1942,
p. 12, Table 4, line 10.
Line 4: Gross private capital formation (Survey, Aug. 1943, p. 13, Table 5, line 8, and
p. 12, Table 1, line 9) minus depreciation and depletion (ibid., p. 12,Table 4, line 3).
Line 5: Nonwar public construction gross, minus estimated depreciation of ii billion for..
each year. For 1939, the figures for gross are from Survey, Feb. 1942, p. 36, Table 15
all public excl. residential, military and naval, and factory; for 1940.42, ibid., Jan.
1943, p. 11, Table 11all public cad. residential, military and naval, and nonresidential
industrial; for first half of 1943, direct from Dept. of Commerce, same categories.
Line 7: From Survey, Aug. 1943, p. 13, Table 5, line 4, and p. 12, Table 1, line 4.
Line 9: Private depreciation and depletion (Survey, Aug. 1943, p. 12, Table 4, line 3)
plus $1 billion for public nonwar.
Line 10: A 10% depreciation charge on a cumulative total of government-financed war
construction. This depreciation ratio is a fairly crude approximation.
The value of finished commodities and services flowing to (or
retained from their production by) households and consuming insti-
tutions (line 1) excludes subsistence and related expenditures by the
government for the armed forces. Theoretically, it should include
them, since it should measure all goods flowing to consumers qua
consumers. There is no more reason to exclude the value of sub-
sistence for the armed services from the flow to consumers (as a
measure of a distinct category of final products) because it is covered
in war outlay than to exclude expenditures on consumer goods by
workers in munitions plants. The subsistence item under war outlay










1 Flow of goods to consumers (excL direct taxes) 61.765.774.682.089.7
2 Value of direct gov. services 3.13.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
3 Total flow to consumers (1 + 2) 64.868.877.785.192.8
4 Net capital formation, private 4.78.312.1 0.28.7
5 Net construction, public, nonwar 1.30.9 1.0 0.30.4
6 Total net capital formation, nonwar (4 + 5) 6.09.213.1 0.59.1
7 War outlay (cxci. depreciation on gov..financed
war construction) 1.42.712.248.078.9
8 National income or net national product
(3+6+7) 72.280.7103.0133.6162.6
9 Depreciation & depletion, private & public nonwar 7.27.4 7.9 8.8 9.0
10 Depreciation, gov.-uinanced war construction negligible 0.3 1.3 2.1
Ii Gross national product (8+9+10) 79.488.1111.2143.7173.7$
the military forces; the value of thegoods involved is part of the flow
of final consumer products from theproductive system.
However, there is considerabledifficulty in measuring this item. It
should include only the part of the allowancefor food, clothing,
shelter, etc., that is a minimum needed bythe armed forces as peace-
time consumers; not the part that representsspecial needs arising
from the particular demands of militaryactivity. Yet the breakdown
of total expenditures on food, clothing,shelter, transportation, etc.
for the armed forces between a peacetimeconsumption minimum and
the special military needs is difficult. It maybe argued that since the
compensation of the armed forces is anarbitrarily determined quan-
tity, a simpler assumption would be to equateit to money payments
alone, thereby allowing in war outlay for theconsumers' expendi-
tures of the armed forces. Butthis would seriously undervalue the
services of the armed forces, calling for a subsequent correction, and
mis-classify under war outlay a part of the flow of goods to con-
sumers. It was deemed preferable tocharacterize the omission as a
qualification upon our estimates of the flow of goods to consumers.
Could this item be included, both flow to consumers and national
product in a year like 1942 would be $2 to $3 billion larger than the
totals in Table i.8
Line 1 fails also to include services to individuals by governments.
In peacetime these services were assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, to be
valued at the amount of direct personal taxes paid by individuals.
There is no reason to modify the assumption in wartime: at least
prewar direct tax payments may still beinterpreted as compensation
for services by governments to individuals, and only the increase in
direct taxes attributed to the additional needs due to war. For this
reason, prewar direct taxes (line 2) are added to round out con-
sumers' expenditures to total outlay (line 3)
The two items of capital formation described as nonwar (lines 4
and 5) raise immediately the problem of distinguishing between war
and nonwar capital goods. Some part of the addition to privately
$ If we assume minimum subsistence at $500 per member of the armed forces, and an
average of 4 million in the armed forces in 1942, the item amounts to $2 billion. Ii
would tend to rise rapidly from 1941 to 1943, accentuating the rise shown in Table 1.
4 It may be argued that a more reasonable estimate would be to allow for an increase in
direct taxes associated with the rising cost per unit of government services. This correc-
tion, however, would be minor in comparison with the major categories involved; and
would call for a subsequent adjustment of the current dollar totals by a price index for
government services. In the calculations to derive totals in 1939 prices, direct taxes were
held constant at the 1939 price level, with the implicit assumption that the real volume
of services to consumers did not change.
4
Sfinanced equipment and construction was, during the years covered
in Table1,specifically designed for the production of war imple-
ments or their components; and a substantial proportion of both
private and public nonwar capital formation, while not immediately
directed at the output of munitions, was due to the expansion of
activity associated with the war. In a sense, all capital formation in a
period of intensive preparation for or participation in a major war is
for military purposes, stimulated in the short run by war needs.
Yet the dassification cannot be based upon purposesfor they are
intangible. It must rather take into account the extent to which equip-
rnent and construction are either of such physical character as to be
suitable only for war production in the narrowest sense or of such
extraordinary sire as can be warranted by war demands alone and in
no way be justified by reasonable estimates of peacetime needs. But
this basis cannot be clearly established with the present data; and the
best practicable criterion is the source of financing. Additions to
capital equipment that are specifically for transient war needs and
are so unwarranted by peacetime prospects as to require government
financing could be defined as capital formation for war purposes.
Private financing or government financing outside the war budget
was considered as evidence that the capital formation involved could
be defined as nonwar in the longer run.
War outlay (line 7) differs from the usual measure in the exclusion
of payments that do not represent a draft upon real resources (prop.
erty purchase, prepayments, and the like); and of depreciation on
government-financed war construction and equipment. Neither ad-
justment can be statistically precise. But it seemed better to attempt
an adjustment than to accept total disbursements classified by the
Treasury under the war account as the value of war production.
Another disadvantage of the estimates of war outlay is that they
usually measure war production at some point before it reaches the
units that dispose of it for purposes of war. Even in the series for
munitions, products accepted by the military agencies and ready for
combat or training use are combined with products still subject to
further modification. While no duplication is involved, war outlay is
not as clearly a fully finished products total as is the flow of goods
to ultimate consumers.
The above qualifications stem from a single cause: the available
information is on categories of outlay by source, which is not an
unambiguous guide to the categories of final products. Yet the dis-
5parities between what we wish and can measure arenot sufficient to
bar significant analysis.
Table 1 reveals the marked changes innational product and in its
compositionthe striking rise in the total in currentdollars from
1939 to 1943; the spectacularclimb of war outlay to stellar levels
and high proportions of total product;the rise in nonwar capital
formation until 1941 and the subsequentdrastic contraction; the
impressive increase in consumers' expenditures,retarded after 1941.
However, there is little purpose in analyzinghere the estimates in
Table1.Our interest is in real output and the relativeproportions of
its components measured in real terms; andfrom this viewpoint
Table1may be quite misleading. Evenin peacetime, current dollar
values tend to disguise movements in real output and contain some
elements of noncomparability in the price structure and the price
movements of different components of the nationalproduct. But these
elements of noncomparability and heterogeneity are few in peacetime
because price changes and shifts are usually not violent. In wartime,
however, prices tend to move violently and bases of valuation for the
war and nonwar sectors of the economy areinherently noncom-
parable. Current dollar estimates are then merely a first step toward
estimates of real output and its components. The next step is ob-
viously to measure price changes and differentials.
3 PRICE CHANGES AND DIFFERENTIALS: THE PROBLEM
To express national product totals, derived as sums of final output
components, each valued at changing price levels and on bases pos-
sibly different from one component to another, as internally con-
sistent magnitudes unaffected by temporal changes in prices we have
to have indexes designed to adjust totals in current prices for both
price changes and differentials.
We begin by assuming that the valuation base current in recent
prewar years for nonwar products is appropriate for deriving national
product totals in real terms comparable as between prewar and war
years. The alternative would be to accept the valuation base in the
war production sector in war years and try to modify the base in the
nonwar sectors; so that each part of total national product would be
valued just as war goods are valued. The difficulty of so translating
all components of national product to the unusual and rapidly shift-
ing valuation base that determines the pricing of war goods is
obvious. But regardless of it, an attempt to get comparable and inter-
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Snally consistent national product totals covering both prewar and war
years should preferably employ prewar valuation bases: they are more
persistent in the longer run and provide a more familiar set of values
for appraising changes during the war.5
If this preference is conceded, the task in the nonwar sector is
reduced to finding reliable measures of changes in prices over time.
Formidable difficulties arise even here. The available price indexes
fail to reflect fully qualitative deterioration in commodities and serv-
ices; the 'pricing up' that takes the form of adding superficial and
unwanted elements to the good, largely in order to raise it into higher
price brackets withçrnt violating price regulations; the reduction in
discounts or in services formerly granted in connection with durable
commodities; pricing on the black markets; and the general effects
of narrowing freedom of choice on the part of would-be civilian
purchasers. As the description below of the procedures indicates, only
a few halting steps can be taken toward overcoming these difficulties.
But for the nonwar sector we can derive indexes of final product
prices which, when applied to current price totals, will yield approxi-
mate estimates of the relevant components of the national product
as categories of final output measured at prewar market values.
The war sector presents much greater difficulties. To begin with,
prices of final products (various items of munitions and of war
construction) are not freely accessible; nor are they in existence dur-
ing the full period spanning both prewar and war years, for the
obvious reason that many of the items were not produced until the
country was well into the war. Even when items produced in 1939-40
and 1942-43 are superficially similar, e.g., war planes, certain types
of guns, and merchant ships, the qualitative change is such that the
resemblance is more in name than in substance. It is impossible to
derive directly a price index of war products that would span both
prewar and war years.
Even were it possible, a major aspect of the difficulty would still
remainprice and valuation bases for the war and nonwar sectors
would still not be comparable; or, following the preference just indi-
catedit would still be difficult to put prices of war products on a
valuation base comparable to that which determines prices of peace-
time goods on the free markets of the economy. The difficulty is of
considerable quantitative import, because commodities and services
With the conclusion of the war, new nonwar bases may be used, preferably of a post-
war year free from the disturbing effects of war.
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for use in the armed conflict are purchased under conditions radically
different horn those that govern peacetime products in the market
place. Consequently, even if we expressed war outlay as totals at
constant prices of munitions, war construction, and nonmurntions, the
valuation of at least the first two components would be quite different
from that of peacetime goods; and we would be adding into national
product physical quantities weighted by a heterogeneous set of
weights.
It may be argued that the rather lavish use of monetary incentives
and of legal measures distinguishing the valuation of war products in
wartime from that of products in peacetime markets representsa
shift in consumer preferences on a par with changes in more normal
times; or that it represents a mere quantitative expansion of thearea
of governmental purchasing arid government-destined production,
which in peacetime also is characterized by valuation rules substan-
tially different from those of the competitive markets of theeconomy.
To the first argument one may reply that if thereare such violent and
drastic shifts in consumer preference, continuous andcomparable
measures of national product cease to have any meaning unless based
on a relatively fixed set of values that consciously ignores such shifts.
A reply to the second argument is that while government-boundpro-
duction and products of the private businesssystem are not valued on
comparable bases in peacetime, the former isso small in years of
peace that the consequent distortion in the national product totals
may be neglected; but that the matter cannot be dismissedso lightly
when the government-controlledsector becomes as large as it does
during a major war.6 Atany rate, it seemed preferable to wrestle
with the problem than to dispose of itsummarily; or reduce it to a
question of temporal changes only in finalproduct prices in thewar
outlay sector.
The attempt being made here is,then, to value war output not at
actual 1939 prices (if such could befound), but at prices it would
have fetched in 1939 had it beenproduced under conditionscom
parable to peacetime; and incircumstances where producers could
attam the efficiency of resource-inputcharacteristic of comparable
peacetime industries grown to maturity withoutthe urgent haste and
I If after this war thescope of governmentcontrolJ activity extendsand continues to be conditioned by rulesquite different from those of the private marketplace, the prob. lens raised here will remain formidableand will require careful reconsideration of the
somewhat arbitrary compromises madein estimating national product for this country before tins war.
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.waste of wartime. The concept mayat first seem unrealistic;but it is
only so far as any applicationof peacetime criteria to wartimeis
unrealistic. And if we are to havenational product totals continuous
and comparable as between prewarand war years, and if we are to
have some basis for evaluating warproduction in its longer range
postwar aspect, we cannotavoid introducing arbitrarily a common
base.
In this attempt we must beginwith evaluation at the levelof
resource-input. At the level of finalproducts there is no comparability
between peacetime goods and warimplements, between pastry and
machine guns. The choice betweenthe two does not take place in the
way consumers choose amongvarious final goods; or in the way
producers choose among capital goods in responseto consumers'
choices of final products. But resources commonto both pastry and
machine guns can be identified; and some canbe specifically tagged
as having been used toproduce the former in a year of peaceand the
larter in a year of war. It is thus at thelevel of resource-input that the
first step can be taken to reduce elementsof heterogeneity (at a point
of time ) and noncomparability (overtime) in the wartime national
product totals in current prices.
The element of heterogeneity intotal national product in wartime
is this: identical or comparable resourcesutilized at a given time for
different ends (e.g., civilian and warproduction) are compensated
at different monetary rates,but the differences in compensationdo
not correspond to differencesin the efficiency of use. Theelements
of noncom parability with prewar years(or during the war itself)
are: (i) identical orcomparable resources in identical orcomparable
uses are compensated atdifferent monetary rates; (ii)identical or
comparable resources shifting todifferent uses (e.g., from peace to
war production) arecompensated at different monetary rates,but the
differences in compensation do notcorrespond to differences in the
efficiency of use.
Therefore measuring war (and hencetotal) output in real terms
raises two distinct questions:(i) What changes occur over timein
the monetary compensationof i4entical or comparable resources?
(ii) Does a change from peace to warproduction mean that identical
or comparable unitsof productive resources axe more orless efficient?
This separation of two elementsin the problem is artificial in thatthe
resources that shift to new usesundergo changes both in monetary
compensation per efficiency unit and inefficiency. But for puçposes
9of measurement it is best to deal with them separately. As the first is
clearly much more susceptible to definition and measurement, it can
be treated first, while the second is disregarded for the time being.
When the first has been dealt with, the relative efficiency of resource-
input in war outlay is considered, largely with the help of tentative,
alternative assumptions.
With the aim indicated, the successive steps are: (i) To measure
changes over time in final product prices for goods included under
flow to consumers, nonwar capital formation, and certain parts of
war outlay (nonmunitions) (Sec. 4a). (ii) To measure changes in
prices of resources entering the major part of war outlay (munitions
and war construction) (Sec. 4a).(iii) To assume changes in the
efficiency of resource-input in the nonwar sectors and nonmunitions;
thus to convert the indexes derived under (i) to indexes of thecom-
pensation of resources, which makes it possible to translate national
product and its components to the level of resource-inputat1939
resource prices (Sec. 4b). (iv) To assume changes in and the relative
levels of the efficiency of resource-input in munitions andwar con-
struction, and to convert the indexes under (ii) to indexes of the final
prices of munitions and war construction, priceson a base identical
with peacetime prices of products of comparable industries.With the
price differentials between peace andwar goods eliminated, national
product and its components can be translated toa consistent level of
final output, at1939prices (Sec. 4).
4 PRICE CHANGES ANDDIFFERENTIALS:
PROCEDURES AND ASSUMPTIONS
a Price Indexes for Products and Resources
The extent to which price and other datacan be made to reflect
quality and quantity changes in thenonwar sector, and differences
in the productivity ofresources between the nonwar and war sectors,
determines the meaning of the totalsin constant prices as measures of
the national product and itscomponents in real terms. While the
procedures are described in detail in theAppendix, a brief statement
is a necessary background for graspingthe meaning of the estimates.
To test the adequacy of the existingprice indexes, used by the
Department of Commerce to translateconsumers' outlay into con-
stant prices, we comparedmovements in 'deflated' totals with changes
mproduction destined for civilianuse; and reviewed the scope of the
price data to see if it was possible to extendtheir application and
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bring their weights into closer correspondence with the subtotals of
consumers' outlay in current prices. The first test was applied to food
products and apparel (clothing and shoes); the second to the price
index used to 'deflate' consumers' outlay on services. In both a sub-
stantial correction for the understatement of the existiQg price indexes
(in this particular use) seemed warranted. In all other commodity
groups and for some sectors of the service group, the available and
customarily used price data could not be adjusted, although they are
commonly acknowledged to reflect but poorly the types of price
change briefly indicated in the opening paragraphs of Section 3. As
a result, even the over-all price indexes derived here for the flow of
goods to consumers probably understate the price rise that occurred;
and the price-adjusted totals, therefore, overstate the increase or
understate the decline in the 'real' volume of consumer goods.
The price indexes for nonwar capital formation used by the De-
partment of Commerce were accepted, representing as they do the
most practicably complete utilization of available data on product
prices. In this group also restrictions and a smaller supply have led
to a quality deterioration of the products; reduction of discounts and
services that were customary in more normal times; and a narrowing
of the freedom of the would-be buyer's choice. There is, therefore,
ground for assuming that here also the price indexes understate the
full extent of the price rise; and that, consequently, the totals adjusted
for price changes are overstatements of volumes in constant prices.
In the treatment of war outlay nonmunitions were separated from
munitions and war construction. The former comprise military pay
and subsistence allowances; civilian pay in war agencies; subsistence
outlays, including clothing and personal equipment as well as travel
for the armed forces; agricultural exports to allies; and similar mis-
cellaneous items. The price indexes for the commodity parts of the
category were based on Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale price
data; for pay items, on known changes in rates of pay. The estimates
are rather crude, but contain no perceptible biases.
Munitions and war construction comprise planes, guns, ammuni-
tion, nava[ ships, merchant ships, war construction units (bariacks,
depots, airfields, etc., government-financed war plants and war hous-
ing); and a host of similar items. The group is dominated by items
of specific use in the armed conflict and subject to the rapid qualita-
tive changes associated with active warfare. The price indexes for it,
based on compensation of resources rather than on prices of final
11
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products, were built up from separate measures for the resource
categories: labor costs and gross profits, the latter in turn allocable
between returns to capital and enterprise on the one hand, and cor-
porate income and excess profit taxes on the other. The weights
assigned to these three categories of resource cost indexes (the price
adjustment was made separately for the three subtotals, each repre-
senting the relevant cost category) were based on the breakdown of
gross value of output in the five war' industries (metal and oil and
gas in mining, metals fabrication, chemicals and petroleum refining
in manufacturing, and contract construction) that accounted for the
bulk of munitions production and war construction in1942.
The price index for the labor factor is an index of hourly earnings
in 44 war manufacturing industries weighted by current year man
hours. The current cost of the capital and enterprise factor was
derived by applying to the total value of munitions and war con-
struction the changing ratio of the combined total of corporate net
income after taxes, depreciation, entrepreneurial income, interest, and
net rents and royalties to the gross value product of the five 'war'
industries listed above. The corresponding price measure was ob-
tained by dividing an index(1939 = 100)of the total value of these
items in the five 'war' industries by a measure of changes in the
physical volume of capital and enterprise input, represented byan
index of the consumption of raw materials of mineral originpre-
pared by G. H. Moore. Finally, it was assumed that the corporate
taxes (income and excess profit) paid in1939were the monetary
equivalent of the government's contribution to business activity; and
that, after1939,such services increased with real output, i.e., with
deflated labor, capital, and enterprise costs. Accordingly, the ratio
of1939taxes in the five 'war' industries to the1939total of labor,
capital, and enterprise costs was applied to the deflated totals ofsuch
costs calculated for munitions and war construction. On theassump-
tion used, the result measured government servicesat1939prices
rendered in connection with these activities.
Clearly the assumptions adopted to derive price indexesfor the
various categories of resources embodied in munitionsand war con-
struction are open to challenge. Attemptsto attach quantities to
processes whose substantive scope is exceedingly difficult to ascertain,
they are submitted here in the realizationthat fuller data may make
better estimates possible in the future. Butcrude as the indexes are
as measures of changes in compensation perresource unit entering
12munitions and war construction, the implicit assumptions are, on the
whole, in the direction of under- rather than overestimating the rise
in resource prices. In the case of both labor and the human part of
capital and enterprise the procedure assumes that the groups involved
are comparable through the years with respect to skill and training.
But this means that the price indexes neglect the dilution of skill and
experience in the labor and managerial groups.T Furthermore, for
both labor and nonlabor factors, the procedure assumes that, within
the industries covered, compensation of factors engaged in war pro-
duction increased from 1939 onward at the same rate as compensation
of factors engaged in the same industry in peace-type work. That is,
the indexes neglect the possibly greater increase by 1941 or 1942 in
the pay to factors engaged in war production proper than in the
compensation of factors still engaged in the same industries in peace-
type work.
True, there are offsetting factors that might reduce the downward
bias of the price indexes. The index of earnings per man hour covers
wage earners in selected industries that by 1942 might be character-
ized as largely war industries. It is quite possible that price per unit
of input of other labor entering war outlay (salaries in war indus-
tries, payments to employees in transportation or other areas serving
war but not comprised in our index) may have risen less from 1939
to 1942 than the man hour earnings in the 44 manufacturing indus-
tries. Similarly, compensation to nonlabor factors, entering war Out-
lay but not covered in our indexes, may have risen less than is indi-
cated. However, a rough balancing of these considerations, which
can be nothing except a guess, would suggest that the offsets indicated
above would not serve to cancel fully the downward bias of the price
indexes. Thus, like the price measures for other components of
national product, and perhaps even to a greater degree, the indexes
of compensation of productive factors entering war outlay tend to
underestimate the effective price rise between 1939 and 1943.
Two aspects of the results of the procedures just described stand
out. The first is the greater rise of prices in 1942 and 1943 shown by
the index, Table 2, line 1, than by the customary cost of living index
(line 5). For reasons indicated in the Appendix, Section ic, part of
the difference may be an improperly full imputation of our adjust-
ments in food and clothing to the price indexes. Perhaps part of the
This may be compensated, but only in part, by the undervaluation of the services of
the armed forces and war agency personnel included under nonmunitions.
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difference should be imputed to a bias in the current dollar value
totals. On the other hand, as already indicated, the adjustments, and
hence the index in line 1, do not take full account of various hidden
forms of price increase in many civilian goods. In our opinion, the
difference between lines 1 and 5 for 1942 and 1943 should be rated
an understatement.
TABLE 2
Price Indexes of Final Products and Resources
Major Components of National Product, 1939-1943
1939 = 100
The indexes in lines i-a are implicit: they were derived by dividing the current dollar
value totals by the corresponding totals in 1939 prices. For a detailed description of the
procedures and the quarterly and annual totals see the Appendix, Section 1-4.
The second significant showing is the relatively sharp rise in prices
of resources put into war outlay (line 3). Since the index covers also
prices (at the final product level) for nonmunitions, which have
risen less sharply, the rate of compensation of resources (associated
with munitions and war constniction proper) rose even more than is
indicated in line 3.
Table 2 brings us to an intermediate stage in the analysis. The in-
dexes in lines 1 and 2 (and some part of that in line 3)are for prices
of final products; those dominating the entries in line 3, for prices
of resources. Were we to apply these indexes in the price adjustment
of the relevant components of national product,one part of the total
would represent a sum offinal productsat their 1939 prices; the other
a sum ofproductive resourcesat their 1939 prices. The two parts
(which were in fact added in Appendix Table 7)can be legitimately
added only by one or two further steps: (1) estimate changesin the
efficiency of resources in the area outside munitions andwar construc-
tion, then convert the final product price indexes intomeasures of
changes in the compensation ofresources at their 1939 efficiency
level; in which case the national product totals,when adjusted for
price changes, become consistentlymeasures of the 'reaF volume of
resource-input at constant efficiency level;or (2) estimate changes





Pr:-e h,dexej br 1939 1940 1941 1942half
I Flow of goods to consumers (exci. gov. services) 100 101 107 122 131
2 Nonwar construction & equipment, gross 100 101 107 112 116
3 War outlay, gross 100 112 128145156
4 Wholesale prices, BLS 100 102 113 128 134
5 Cost of living, BLS 100 101 106117 124and war construction, changes measured agamst the relative8 effi-
ciency of comparable resources (i.e., in the five 'war' industries) in
1939; then convert the totals for munitions and war construction into
measures of final output, comparable with the other components of
national product.
b Conversion to Prices of Resources
Whatever scattered data on the efficiency of resources in the nonwar
sector are available (chiefly in a few manufacturing and mining
industries and utilities on a per man hour base) suggest that the rise
since 1939 has been moderate, at an annual rate of not more than
2 or 3 per cent; that it virtually ceased by 1942; and that in recent
quarters, as the scale of operations in many civilian industries declined
and dilution of labor and other resources took place, efficiency per
resource unit may have declined slightly.
On the basis of such meager evidence, a quarterly efficiency index
was constructed and applied uniformly to the price indexes (at final
product prices) for three of the major components of national prod-
uct (flow to consumers, excluding direct taxes; nonwar construction
and equipment; the nonmunitions part of war outlay). The price
indexes for final products were thereby converted into price indexes
for resources at their 1939 efficiency
Even if this single efficiency index is accurate, the application of
one and the same index to such different groups of final products as
are represented by consumers' outlay, nonwar construction and equip-
ment, and nonmunitions is clearly arbitrary. Efficiency of resources
put into construction and equipment may have risen less or more than
efficiency of resources in the production, transportation, and distri-
bution of consumer goods; and it may well be asked how produc-
tivity of resources in such a heterogeneous category as 'nonmunitions'
can be gauged. But it seemed preferable to make the assumption, on
whatever little ground could be found, then show the modification
in the customary measures called for, if only to stress the questions
that must be answered in any consistent estimate of national output
or input in real terms.
Comparison of the indexes in Tables 2 and 3 reveal relatively
minor differences, largely because the scanty data indicate merely
8Relative to efficiency of resources in the rest of the economy.
9See Appendix, Section 5, especially Appendix Tables 8 and 9. In actual calculations
adjustments were made in the totals defiated by final product prices.
15$
minor changes in the efficiency ofresources embodied in the flow of










All indexes are implicit, andwere derived by dividing the current dollar valuetotals by the corresponding totals in1939 resource prices.
Since changes in the prices ofall components are measuredon the
same base in Table 3, price indexes implicitin the national product
totals can be derivecLlo Itmust be clearly understood that theseare
indexes of resource prices,and that, strictly speaking, thetotals to
which they applyare not those of national product, i.e., finaloutput, but of nationalresource-input."
The striking features of theseindexes (lines 4 and 5)are their rise
to relatively high levels by1943 and the acceleration ofthe rise after
1941. In the twoyears 1939-41 they rose only 13-14per cent; in the
following year andthree-quarters almost 30per cent, partly because
of a fairly steep rise from1941 to the first half of1943 in resource
prices in war outlay, partlybecause of the largeincrease in the weight of war outlay innational product.
c Conversion to Prices of FinalProducts
The main question hereconcerns the relative efficiency ofresources used in munitionsproduction andwar construction. The only evi- dence is scatteredinformation on the changein labor efficiency in some areas of munitionsproduction (planes,merchant ships), which
suggests a marked rise in laborproductivity in munitionsindustries. There are no datathat would serveeven to suggest the relative efilci-
10 This is truewith the exception ofgovernment services to individuals(direct taxes). which are included at thesame absolute level in thecurrent dollar and price adjusted totals. The item, however,is relatively small, andof slight effecton the implicit price indexes.
11 Not the fulltotal of all resource.inputsince resources devotedto clearly unproductive activities (e.g., robbery or forbiddendrug peddling)are presumably excluded. The total embraces onlyresource-input in uses not explicitlyrecognized by society as deleterious.
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TABLE 3
Price Indexes of Resources




ofRejoiu'c,, £wbodjtd ii, 1939 1940 1941 1942
I Flow of goods to consumers (exc.gov. services) 100 103 112 129 2 Nonwar Construction & equipment,gross 100 104 112 118 3 War outlay, gross 100 112 130 147 4 Gross national product 100 104 113 133 5 Net national product 100 104 114 135ency of resources in munitions and warconstruction compared with
their productivity in similar (i.e., five 'war') industries in 1939
except again fragmentary data on loss of labor timepaid for due to
labor 'hoa.rding', difficulties of attaining a smooth flow of materials
and components, and troubles arisiifrom rapid changes in technical
specifications due to flu.id conditions of active warfare.
For lack of evidence, assumptions had to be made. Theresults, of
illustrative value, can be converted into tentative substantive conclu-
sions only by an exercise of judgment. The three assumptions inthe
calculation differed in the relative efficiency assigned to resource-
input for the first half of 1943. Assumption a set the level of efficiency
in munitions and war construction at 80; for the other areas intotal
output, at 105. This meant that whatever the efficiencyratio of re-
sources in the five 'war' industries to resourcesin all 'othef industries
was in 1939, the corresponding ratio inthe first half of 1943 was
lower by the proportion of (105-80)/105. Assumption b set the
relative efficiency level in munitions and war construction in thefirst
half of 1943 at the efficiency ratio of the five 'ware industries in 1939
Assumption c set the relative efficiency level in munitions and war
construction in the first half of 1943 higher than the correspond-
ing ratio for the five 'war' industries in 1939, by theproportion of
(130_105)/105.12
The three assumptions specify different levels of relative efficiency
of munitions production and war construction in the first half of 1943
compared with other industries. In addition, we assume for all three
a similar movement of the relativeefficiency level between 1939 and
the recent quarters, namely: (i) that relative efficiency increased two-
thirds from 1939 to the first half of 1943; (ii) that the increase was
fairly steady through 1941; (iii) that in the last quarterof 1941, but
especially in the first and second quarters of 1942, the upward trend
was damped by the precipitousexpansion of munitions production
and war construction; (iv) that relative efficiency roserapidly after
12 The assumptions indicate nothing concerning the efficiency of resources in munitions
and war construction on the one hand, and in all other production, onthe other. They
relate directly to the ratio between two ratios: (i) the ratio in 1939between efficiency
in five war' industries and in other sectors of national output;(ii) the ratio between
efficiency in munitions and war construction in 1943 and efficiency in other sectorsof
national output. Assumption a states that the ratio of(ii)to (i)is 0.76(i.e.,
(80/105) : 1); assumption 1' that it is 1.0 (i.e., (105/105) : 1);assumption c that it is
1.24 (i.e., (130/105) : 1). However, the assumptions imply arelation between the
efficiency of resources iii munitions production and war construCtion in 1943and in five
war industries in 1939: by assumption a, theformer is at a level of 0.8 of the latter;
assumption 1'. of 1.05, by assumption, of 1.3.
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the second quarter of 1942 as plants were completed, mass produc-
tion of munitions began to hit its stride, and the pains of rapid growth
subsided.'3
Upon these assumptions, we convert indexes of resource prices for
munitions production and war construction into indexes of finalout-
put prices, with prices on the same bases as comparable productswere
valued in a prewar year like 1939 (Table 4, lines 3a, 3b, and3c).
Since these indexes are consistent with those for the flow of goodsto
consumers and nonwar capital formation, implicit measures of price
changes in total national product also can be derived (Table 4, lines
4 and 5).
Clearly, the price indexes for war outlay are not interms of 1939
as 100: they could yield such an entry comparable with one of 100
for prices in other sectors of final output only if the efficiencyof re-
source-use in war production could be assumed to stand in thesame
relation to efficiency in these other sectors ofoutput as characterized
the five comparable industries at their 1939 productivitylevel. The
degree to which the entries inlines 3a, 3b, and3c exceed 100 in 1939
is a measure of how far the relative efficiency ofresources in war
production was assumed to fall short of that incomparable industries
in 1939.
II we wish to measure temporal price changesalone, without cor-
recting for any differences in theway prices measure real output in
the war sector as compared with thenonwar, entries in Table 4, lines
3a, 3b, and 3c, can be converted to relatives of1939 and the results
averaged. The price index so derived, line 6,rises moderately to 1942,
then declines to the first half of 1943.14
Differences among the various price indexesin Table 4 are as might
be expected. If we allow for the lowerefficiency of resource-use in
war production as compared with therest of the economy, and thus
for a higher price level in it, thevery increase in the proportion of
war outlay in national product causesan upward movement in the
price indexes for national productas a whole. Thus, under assump-
13 The assumedmovement in the relative efficiency of resourceuse, as distinct from the level assumed for therst half of 1943, is based for theyears since 1941 upon a rough
check with the expansion in munitionsoutput weighted by constant prices. The three
a5sulnptions concerning the relative efficiency levelin the first half of 1943 are iHus-
trative; and the preference, in subsequentdiscussion, for assumptiona is based largely
upon scattered evidence of lavish (by peacetime standards)use of manpower and mate- rials in war production.
14 For detailed calculationssee Appendix Table 13.
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tion a the over-all price index rises 50 per cent from 1939 to the first
half of 1943 (lines 4a and 5a). The failure to allow for the lower
efficiency of resources in war outlay yields an over-all price index
that rises only 18 or 19 per cent from 1939 to 1942, and in 1943
rises somewhat less than 1 per cent further(lines 7 and 8).
TABLE 4
Price Indexes of Final Products
Three Assumptions concerning the Relative Efficiency of ResourceInput in
Munitions Production and War Construction, 1939-1943
Lines 1 and 2 from Table 2. For detailed calculations of entries in lines 3a, 3b, 3c, see
Appendix, Section 6. Entries in lines 4 and 5 derived from current dollar value and price
adjusted totals (see App. Tables 6 and 12).
Line 6: arithmetic mean of relatives of lines 3a, 3b, and 3c (1939= 100).
Lines 7 and 8 calculated from current dollar value totals (App. Table 6) and price
adjusted totals (adjusted by lines 1, 2, and 6). Line 9 derived by dividing Department
of Commerce gross national product totals by its totals reduced to 1939 prices. The
concept in line 9 is one that includes in gross national product all governmentoutlays
(see note 2).
It is significant that the index implicit in the Department of Com-
merce adjustment of gross nationalproduct for price changes is
similar to that in line 8. In its adjustment the Department assumes
that final prices of munitions do not change over time, and that they
are comparable with prices in the nonwar sectorsof the economy.
This is tantamount to saying that a war outlay price index is affected
only by changes in the prices of nonmunitions (and in the Depart-




Price Indexes for 1939 1940 194! 1942half
1 Flow of goods to consumers (cxci. gov. services) 100 101 107 122 131
2 Nonwar construction & equipment, gross 100 101 107 112 116
3 War outlay, gross
a) Assumption a 163 175 188 190 182
b) Assumptionb 138148 157158 150
c) Assumptionc 119126 134 133 127
4 National income
a) Assumption a 101 102 113140 154
b) Assumptionb 101 102 111 133 141
c) Assumptionc 100 102 109126 130
5 Gross national product
a) Assumption a 101 102 112138 150
b) Assumptionb 101 102 110131 138
c) Assumptionc 100 101 109 124 128
6 War outlays disregarding relative
efficiency in war production 100 107 114114 109
7 National income (based on lines 1, 2, 6) 100 101 108 119120
8 Gross national product (based on lines 1, 2, 6)100 101 107 118119
9 Gross national product, Dept. of
Commerce adjustment & concept 100 101 106114117S
Hate' war Construction). The resulting price index is bound to be
similar to an index measuring only temporal changes in the prices of
war outlay, without allowing for the relatively lower efficiency of
resource-use. Line 9 differs from line 8 only in that it is somewhat
lower in 1942 and 1943, and rises slightly more from 1942 to 1943.
Both differences are due to the specific assumptions used here as to
the movement over time in the efficiency of resource-use in munitions
and war construction.
a The Several Variants
With the alternative price indexes discussed in Section 4, national
product totals and their components at constant price levels in several
variants are derived (Table 5). The meaning of each variant must be
clearly perceived before the differences they show in the movement
of national product over time, in the distribution among the major
components, and in the relative magnitudes of the absolute increases
and declines in the components and the totals can be analyzed.
The variants in lines 1 represent an adjustment of current dollar
figures by indexes that measure changes in prices ofresources (base
1939). The results of such an adjustment are, therefore, sums ofre-
sources valued at their 1939 prices. Line 1-1, e.g., is the sum of pro-
ductive resources embodied in the flow of goods toconsumers, these
resources weighted at their 1939 prices, i.e., at their 1939 efficiency
as represented by the prices they fetched in that year. A similar state-
ment, with modifications in the description of the categories of final
products into which the resources entered,can be made for lines 11-1,
111-1, IV-i, and V-i.
The variants in lines 2 representan adjustment of current dollar
figures by indexes that measure changes in final productprices. The
four variants differ in the degree to whichthey allow, in the transi-
tion from the resource level ofmeasurement to the final product
level of measuring munitions andwar construction, for differences
in the relative efficiency ofresource-use. The variants under (a), (b),
and (c) assume that theresource-use in munitions and war construc-
tion is at an efficiency level (relativeto the rest of the economy) dif-
ferent from that characterizing similartypes of industrial output (i.e.,
largely of the metal working, chemical,and construction industries)
in 1939. The variant under (d) disregardssuch differences in effi-
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5 NATIONAL PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES
Sciency level between munitions and var construction and its prewar
civilian counterpart, and adjusts the current dollar value figures only
for temporal changes in the final product prices of war goods.
TABLE 5
National Product and Its Components, Wartime Concept, 1939-1943
1939 Prices, Final Product and Resource Levels
(dollar figures in billions)
Compsnei.0,jd To:iJi
J Flow of goods to consumers
1 At resource prices
2 At final product prices
II Nonwar capital formation, gross
1 At resource prices
2 At final product prices
III War outlay, gross
1 At resource prices






IV Net national product
1 Atresourceprices





V Gross national product
1 Atresourceprices





All entries except II1-2d, IV-ld, and V.2d from Appendix Tables 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
The d line entries are calculated with the help of the index in Table 4, line 6.
Lines 2a are then the sums of final products weighted by their 1939
prices, on the assumption that in converting resource-input in muni-
tions and war construction into final products, the efficiency of use,
relative to the rest of the economy, was in 1939 at .48 of the relative
efilciency level of comparable peacetime industries (metal mining
and manufacturing, chemicals and construction) ani rose to 0.8 by
the first half of 1943. The same statement could be repeated for
entries in lines 2b and 2c, with changes in the ratios to 0.63 and 1.05;
and 0.78 and 1.3 respectively.15
15 This statement repeats the assumptions as to both relative levels and movement dis-

























Lines 2d are quite different: theyare the sums of final products
weighted by their 1939 prices; but withoutany allowance, in con-
verting resource-input in munitions andwar construction into final
products, for any difference in the relativeefficiency of use (relative
to the rest of the economy) from that in comparablepeacetime in-
dustries.
The distinction between the estimatesat resource and at final
product levels is clear; and which is chosendepends primarilyon the
specific use to which the estimatesare to be put. Similarly, the choice
between the final product totalsthat do (a, b, c) and donot (d)
allow for differences in relativeefficiency betweenwar production
and peacetime production ofcomparable character is also clear:for
any purposes in which national product totals, inreal terms, are to be
compared as betweenprewar and war years and in whichrelative
magnitudes of war and other productionare to be established in final
product terms, only variants ofthe (a) to (c) type shouldbe em-
ployed.
But the choiceamong the three variants expressingdifferent
assumptions concerning the relativeefficiency ofresources in muni-
tions and war production isnot easy; for it is based, noton theoretical
criteria, but on differencesin the validity ofassumptions concerning
a phenomenon, accurate observationof which is extremelydifficult. As already indicated,preference for any of thesethree variants (Or
any of this type using different levelsof and trends in therelative efficiency of war production)cannot be groundedupon much tangible
evidence and isa matter of rough judgment.
In making this judgmentit should be noted thatas far as the
national product totals andtheir distributionare concerned, the choice among the variantsa, b, and c (and perhapsany others of similar
character that mayreasonably be devised) is ofquantitative import- ance only for 1942 and1943. Before 1942 totalwar outlay was too small a proportion ofnational product (nomatter how measured)
for differences inits price adjustmentto have much effect. Evenin 1942 the spreadamong the three variants(for the national product totals) is about 10per cent. Only in the firsthalf of 1943 do the quantitative effects of thechoice among thethree variants become decisive.
We definitely prefervariant a, with itsassumption that the rela- tive efficiency ofresourceuse in war productionin the first half of
221943 was still below that of comparable prewar industries. This
judgment should be clearly understood as referring to efficiency in
munitions and war construction in 1943, not as compared with it in
the same industries in 1942, 1941, or 1939, or as compared with that
of resources in nonwar industries in 1943 or any earlier year. The
judgment is that, relative to the efficiency of resource-use incom-
parable prewar industries in 1939, that of resources in munitions and
war construction in the first half of 1943 was still lower, some 20
per cent. In other words, utilization of labor (measured, e.g., by idle
hours Out of total paid or by diversion to lesser jobs to fill in gaps);
of materials (measured, e.g., by rates of consumption compared with
those at more mature stages of technology); of machinery (measured
not at time rates but at input rates per unit, compared again with the
practices of the more mature and gradually developing industries
such as those of peacetime) was, in the first half of 1943, still below
the prewar par.
Our preference should not be interpreted as an adverse verdict
upon this country's enterprise or as depreciation of the enormous
task met during the months since our entry into the war. That with
the pressure to turn out munitions in huge quantities, with rapidly
changing demands of warfare, and with drains upon manpower and
management by calls into the armed forces, relative efficiency in war
production can be assumed to be only 20 per cent below that of com-
parable peacetime industries is a matter for congratulation rather
than condemnation. But just as it would be dangerous to minimize
the gigantic productive task met, so would it be misleading to ignore
the patent fact that resources were not used as economically as they
might have been had the more efficient methods feasible with slower
growth under more normal competitive conditions been possible. Re-
gardless of the validity that may be attached to the specific figure
used in assumption a (which should perhaps be somewhat higher
or lower), we believe that an assumption that assigns to war produc-
uon a iowr level of relative efficiency in the first half of 1943 than
existed in similar industries before the war is decidedly more plausible
than assumptions that put it equal to or above the standard set by
comparable industries before the war.
b Increase over the Period
As already indicated, the estimates that seem preferable are either
those that value the national product at resource prices or at final
23I
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product prices on assumption a; and discussion is confined to those
two.
The totals, whether gross or net, are roughly 50 per cent greater
in the first half of 1943 than in 1939 (Table 6). Of this increase,
about one-half occurred before this country entered the war. The in-
crease in national product during the year and three-quarters asso-
ciated with active participation in the war is not significantly greater
than that during the preceding two years.
These findings differ considerably from those suggested by the De-
partment of Commerce totals, and by such widely used measures of
industrial production as the Federal Reserve Board index. The De-
TABLE 6
Percentage Increase in Nattonal Product, Wartime Concept, Selected Periods
1939 Prices, Several Variants
Entries under I and II based on Table 5. Entries under Ill basedon Department of
Commerce figures and the Federal Reserve Board index (revisedas of Oct. 1943).




















I Net national product
1 Atresourceprices
2 At final product prices
i) Regarding relative efficiency
in war production
in assumption a1
















11 Gross national product
I Atresourceprices 23.810.2
2 At final product prices
I) Regarding relative efficiency
in war production
inassumptiona1







1 Dept. of Commerce G.N.P. in 1939 prices
i) Dept. of Commerce concept 26.718.2
ii) Adj. to our concept 31.520.1






Assumptionc 29.013.2partment of Commerce total of gross national product, based upon
its concept and price adjustment, rises 75 per cent; only one-third of
this increase occurs between 1939 and 1941. Readjusted to our con-
cept, its total rises 86 per cent from 1939 to the first half of 1943;
only somewhat more than one-third of this increase occurs during the
first two years. The Federal Reserve Board index, which would nat-
urally rise more since it is more heavily weighted by industrial com-
modity production, rises 114 per cent from 19M) to the first half of
1943; four-tenths of the increase occurs between 1939 and 1941. The
difference between the estimates devised and preferred here and those
used by the Department of Commerce is due largely to a different
treatment of the value of war production; that between our measures
and the Federal Reserve Board index is due partly to a difference in
coverage and partly to a different treatment of productivity of factors
in the war industries.16
The rates of increase in our national product total at resource or
at final product prices are in themselves not unusual. In the two de-
cades, 1919-38, for which annual estimates are available there are
increases of the same relative magnitude. From 1921 to 1923 national
income in 1929 prices rose 25 per cent and gross national product
23 per cent; from 1935 to 1937, they rose 23 and 21 per cent respec-
tively. These increases compare with a 24 to 27 per cent increase from
1939 to 1941; and with an increase of either 16 or 22 per cent from
1941 to the first half of 1943. Selecting a longer period, we find that
from 1933 to 1937, four years, national income in constant prices in-
creased 43 per cent and gross national product 37 per cent, which
compares with roughly 50 per cent from 1939 to the first half of 1943.
From 1933 to 1936 the increase in national income in constant prices
was 32 per cent and in gross national product 28 per cent, compared
with 37 and 33 per cent increases from 1939 to 1942.17
These numerical comparisons, however, disregard the phase of the
business cycle represented by the initial years. Each period selected
16 The FRB index is based, for recent years, upon man hour input in many war indus-
tries, weighted by productivity levels extrapolated from 1939. No allowance is made
for possibly lower efficiency levels in the war industries as compared with relative
efficiency of similar industries in 1939.
17 All figures for national income 1919-38 from National Income and Its Corn position,
National Bureau, 1941, I, Table 5, p. 147, and for gross national product from unpub-
lished estimates prepared by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The comparison
should properly be confined to the variant at final product prices, since national income
figures have been adjusted for price changes with the help of final product price indexes.
But during relatively short periods in the more 'normal' peace years, the difference in
movement between the two levels would not be sizable.
25S
from the two decades 1919-38 begins with a year of deep depression,
either 1921 or 1933, with the sole exception of 1935-37, and even
1935 was a year fairly low in the cyclical expansion phase. Under such
conditions total output in real terms may easily rise by substantial
percentages within a fairly short period. In contrast, 1939 was not a
year of depression: the level of activity (as measured by national in-
come or gross national product in constant prices) somewhat exceeds
that of the preceding peak year in the business cycle, 1937. To attain
large relative rises, as much as 50 per cent during somewhat less than
four years, from such a relatively high base is an achievement unique
in the historical course of our national economy during recent de-
cades.18
c Share of War Outlay
The changing ratio of war outlay to national product is of particular
interest in wartime as an indication of the proportion of resources or
final products devoted to war. As a measure of the full impact of the
war upon the national economy, it has serious limitations: it disre-
gards the effect of the war on the capital structure of the country,
while its meaning in terms of effects upon the welfare of the popula-
tion is obviously contingent upon the level of national product per
capita, the rate at which civilian supply per capita declines, and the
(Note 17 conci.)
It may be argued that the comparison is improper, since in any cyclical expansion the
portion of total output accounted for by the less efficient 'new' industries (similar to
munitions and war construction) may increase; and a procedure similar to the one used
here to get at a comparable valuation of final products would tend to accelerate the
upward rate of the price indexes and thus retard the rise in the price-adjusted totals.
No such price adjustment was applied to the estimates for1919-38.
The validity of this argument depends upon the correctness of the assumption that
there is a substantial rise during cyclical expansions in the proportion of output by the
less efficient 'newS industries (beyond the rising secular trend in their share). It is to be
doubted greatly that such an increase even approximates the degree to which the relative
share of war outlay increased in 1942 and 1943, at least for areas in peacetime economy
so 'new' and so far below comparable industries in general in relative efficiency as were
munitions and war construction.
18Somewhat more significant results might have been obtained in this analysis had we
attempted to measure the rise in national product in relation to the underlying long term
trend, instead of from a given point of time. However, the establishment of such a trend
is beset with difficulties; and its values at the end of the long period to which the trend
line would have to be fitted would be subject to particularly wide margins of error.
Another refinement of the estimates in Table 6 (and in Tables 7 and 8) is to base
them on quarterly rather than annual totals. These quarterly estimates, presented in the
Appendix, can be used in calculations that span the full period and distinguish between
the quarters prior to and following Pearl Harbor. In view of the approximate character
of the estimates and the greater margin of error in the quarterly than in the annual
totals, it did not seem necessary to go beyond the annual totals.
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distribution of goods among consumers. However, it is a rough ap-
proximation to what is wanted; and in view of its wide current usage,
its movement should be established on the basis of estimates derived
here.
The share of war outlay in national product increased rapidly from
1939 to the first half of 1943-from I or 2 per cent to a percentage
running from 38 to 45; also, as would be expected, most sharply from
1941 to 1942 (Table 7).
TIBLE 7
Percentage of War Outlay in National Product, Wartime Concept, 1939-1943
Differences between our estimates and those of the Department of
Commerce are relatively minor. Even if we apply the Department's
method of price adjustment to our concept, the share in 1942 and the
first half of 1943 does not greatly exceed that measured here at re-
source prices, partly because our adjustment corrects the prices of both
consumer goods and war outlay for upward biases. Consequently, the
relevant distribution of national product, which in 1942 and 1943 is
almost completely accounted for by these two components, is not
greatly affected.
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1939 Prices, Several Variants




1At resource prices 1.93.110.332.745.2
2 At final product prices
i) Regarding relative efficiency
in war production
in assumption a1












11 Gross national product
I At resource prices 1.82.8 9.830.942.9
2 At final product prices
















1 Dept. of Commerce G.N.P. in 1939 prices
i) Dept. of Commerce concept 1.62.810.533.346.3
ii) Adj. to our concept 1.83.111.335.348.5
'Net national product





See source notes to Table 6.S
However, there is a sizable difference between the share of war out-
lay for 1942 as measured here in final product prices (variant a) and
the Departmenfs. Indeed, the most significant finding in Table 7 is
the difference between the shares at the resource price and final product
price (variant a) levels. If one thinks of the distribution of resources
regardless of their efficiency, war outlay in 1942 accounts for overone-
third of the national total, whether gross or net. But adjusted for rela-
tive efficiency in the use of resources and expressed in terms of final
products, it is only about one-fourth. This difference is natural since
we assume that in the first year of active participation in the war a
larger proportion of the countrys resources was used, because of
lower efficiency, to turn out a share of final products thatwas not cor-
respondingly larger. The difference between the two ratios hadnar-
rowed materially by the first half of 1943; and if efficiency continues
to improve the difference will vanish, or perhaps even change sign.
d Source of Increase in War Outlay
More commodities and services can be produced for the armedcon-
flict either by shifting resources from civilian towar production or by
increasing the total resources put into activeuse, or by both methods.
When the increase in war outlay and the changes in thenonwar com-
ponents of national product and total product itself are compared in
terms of current prices (and appropriate categories), they indicate the
financial sources of war outlay; but cannot properly be usedto study
the resource or final product balance. However, Table 8 includesnot
only the totals and components at constantresource or product prices,
but also at current pricesprimarily to indicate how misleadingthe
current dollar totals can be in periods of rapid differential price shifts.
From 1939 to 1941 the several variants of national product andits
components at constant prices are roughly similar (Table 8, Part A).
There is a substantial increase in total national product andan in-
crease in each of the three major componentswar outlay, flow of
goods to consumers, and other components (nonwarcapital forma-
tion in our concept, private gross capital formation plusnonwar gov-
eminent outlay in the Department of Commerce total). The rise in
war outlay is a fraction of the total rise in national productinprac-
tically all variants less than a half, and ranging ingeneral from one-
fourth to somewhat over one-third. Even thecurrent price totals are






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The picture from 1941 to the first half of 1943 is quite different
(Table 8, Part B). In general, war outlay climbs precipitously, appre-
ciably more in every variant than total national product. The differ.
ence between the two is balanced by amarked decline in the 'other'
components, i.e., nonwar capital formation(and, in the Department
of Commerce concept, nonwar expenditures of government, although
the decline in it is minor).
The significant differences among the several variants for 1941-43
are in the extent to which the rise in waroutlay can be associated with
an increase in national product oraccounted for by declines in the
nonwar components. Measuresbased on our concept and in the
variants that seem preferable, i.e., totals at resource or at final product
prices (variant a), indicate that somewhat less than one-half of the
increase in war outlay is accounted for by a rise in total national
product. The other half is balanced by a decline in nonwar capital
formation and a very minor drop in the flow of goods to consumers.
In the Department of Commerce estimates, either based upon its
own concept or adjusted to our concept, therise in national product
amounts to 70, instead of less than 50, per cent of the rise in war out-
lay from 1941 tQ the first half of 1943. The decline in the 'other' com-
ponents, i.e., chiefly in private gross capital formation, amounts to less
than one-third of the increase in war outlay; and the balance is ac-
counted for by a minor rise in the flow of goods to consumers.1°
An even more strikingly different picture is suggested by the cur-
rent dollar totals if we assume that the rise in national product should
be associated first and completely with the increase in war outlay.
On this assumption almost 90 per cent of the increase in war outlay
is accounted for by the increase in total national product, and only
10 per cent by the net reduction in the nonwar components combined.
Obviously the impression that the tremendous increase in war pro-
duction has been attained to such a preponderant extent by an increase
in national output and to such a minor extent by drafts upon nonwar
outputan impression that can all too easily be formed on the basis
of current dollar figuresis far from the truth, if the analysis of the
total product in real terms, as suggested in the upper part of Table 8,
is at all valid.
19 This calculation is based upon counting the full rise in national productas a source
of the rise in war outlay, rather than allowing part of it to account for the rise in the
flow of goods to consumers. The results would be practically the same were we to
reduce the increase in national product by the increase in the flow of goods to consumers,
and treat the remainder alone as a source of augmented war outlay.
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6 SUMMARY
a) National product in wartime is defined as the sum of finished out-
put: (i) flow of goods to ultimate consumers; (ii)additions to the
stock of nonwar capital; (iii) flow of goods to war uses; (iv) addi-
tions to the stock of war capitaL2° It is net or gross as components
(ii) and (iv) are taken net or gross of the current consumptionof
durable capital goods.
Changes in prices over time and differentials in pricingbases
between the nonwar and war components are large during amajor
war. Consequently, estimates ofnational product and its components
at current prices become misleading asindexes of movements in the
totals and in the relative proportions of components inreal' terms,
i.e., as physical volumes weighted by prices constant overtime and
consistent as to base among the several components.
In passing from totals at current to totals at constant prices,the
adjustment must be so designed as to take into account bothchanges
in prices over time and the differences in pricingbases between war
and nonwar production. Only in such a way can a continuousseries of
comparable measures, spanning both prewar and war years,be de-
rived.
Such an adjustment is attempted here on twolevels. First, in-
dexes, based on 1939, of changes in the prices of resourcesfrom 1939
to 1943 were computed. Theirapplication to current dollar value
totals yielded estimates of resource-input, totaland for the major com-
ponents of final output, resources beingweighted at 1939 prices and
thus at their 1939 relative efficiency levels.Second, with the help of
assumptions concerning the relative efficiency of resource-usein the
production of munitions and in war construction,all indexes were
converted into measures of changes in the pricesof final products.
Their application to current dollar valuetotals yielded estimates of
Jinal output, total and for the major components,weighted by their
1939 prices and with war goodspriced on a base comparable with that
of peace-type products.
Total national product adjusted for changesin the prices of
resources (i.e., total inputof resources at their 1939 efficiency and
price levels) increased slightly morethan 50 per cent from 1939 to
the first half of 1943. In terms offinal output and on the most plaus-
ible assumption concerning the relativeefficiency of munitions pro.
20 Components (iii) and (iv) are referred to subsequently as warproduction or the war
sector; and components (I) and (ii) as nonwar.
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duction and war construction, total national product increased some-
what less. Both increases are appreciably less than that shown by the
Department of Commerce gross national product totals in 1939 prices.
Estimates based on the Department's concept and price adjustments
increase 75 per cent; those based on our concept but using the De-
partment's price adjustments 86 per cent.
An increase in either gross or net national product, at constant
prices, of about 50 per cent during somewhat less than four years
can be matched in peacetime experience (e.g., from 1933 to 1937).
The recent increase is unusual in that it came not after a deep cyclical
trough but after 1939, which cannot be described as a year of depres-
sion, for its levels of over-all output were somewhat above those of
the inmdiately preceding cyclical peak (1937).
Both the resource-input and the preferred final output estimates
derived here increase from 1939 to 1941 as much as or somewhat
more than from 1941 to the first half of 1943 (allowing for the some-
what shorter interval). In contrast, the Department of Commerce
estimates of gross national product at constant prices (using either
the Department's or our concept) increase from 1941 to the first half
of 1943 about one and a half times more than from 1939 to 1941
(again allowing for the difference in the length of the two periods).
In both total input of resources and final output, the share of
the war sector rises precipitouslyfrom 1 or 2 per cent in 1939 to
about 40 in the first half of 1943; the share of the nonwar sectors
declines correspondingly. The ratios derived here of war production
to national product at the final output level are lower than those
based on Department of Commerce gross national product totals in
1939 prices (employing our concept): for the first half of 1943 the
percentage accounted for by war production as measured here is 38,
compared with 49 for the Department's estimates modified to agree
with our concept.
1) Between 1939 and 1941 the increase in the volume of resources
devoted to war production or in the total of final products represented
by the latter was merely a fraction (roughly one-third to four-tenths)
of the increase in total resource-input or total final output. Therewas
concurrently a substantial rise in resource-input or product-output
represented by the flow of goods to consumers andnonwar capital
formation. These conclusions are similar to those suggested bycur-
rent dollar value totals and by the Department of Commerce gross




In contrast, from 1941 to the first halfof 1943 the increase in
the volume of resources devoted to warproduction or in the total of
final products represented by the latter wasmuch greater than in
total resource-input or total final output.Our estimates, in terms of
either resources or final products, showthat the rise in national prod-
uct from 1941 to the firsthalf of 1943 was somewhat less than one-
half of the rise in war production; thecompensating changes are a
marked decline in nonwar capitalformation and a minor drop in the
flow of goods to consumers. Thus atleast one-half of the increase in
war production wasachieved by drafts upon nonwar capitalforma-
tion and (to a very minor extent) uponthe flow of goods to con-
sumers.
This conclusion differs from thatsuggested either by the De-
partment of Commerce totals inconstant prices or by currentdollar
value totals. The former indicate anincrease in gross national product
from j941 to the first half of 1943equal to about seven-tenths ofthe
increase in war production; thusonly three-tenths of the latter is ac-
counted for by a decrease in the nonwarsectors, largely nonwar
capital formation. In currentdollar values the increase innational
product is nine-tenths of that in waroutlay; and if the former is fully
counted as a source of the latter, onlyone-tenth of the greater outlay
on war production wasobtained through contraction of the nonwar
sectors. Thus our estimates,whidi tend to deflate' war productionto
terms comparablewith nonwar output, indicate forthe period 1941
to the first half of 1943 agreater dependence of therise in the war
sector upon contractionin the nonwar sectors,and relatively less
dependence upon the rise in totalnational product.
It would be superfluous tolabor the significance of theconclusions
suggested by our estimates; and ofthe difference between themand
those suggested by currentdollar value totals or estimatesbased on
the more orthodox priceadjustment followed by the Departmentof
Commerce. They clearlyaffect our understanding of theover-all
changes in the output ofthe economy and in itsapportionment be-
tween the nonwarand war sectors during recent years.Nor is it neces-
sary to stress theimportance of such conclusions to anyview of the
capacity of the economyand of problems of postwardevelopment.
This bearing of the analysis uponthe understanding of changes in
the economic scene inwartime justifies the attemptmade here to de-
rive estimates, despitethe obvious difficultiesand the necessity of
resorting to assumptionsthat may well be questioned.The tentative
33character of our assumptions and the resulting qualifications upon the
estimates have been repeatedly stressed. One may add merely that
the analysis should be viewed as an illustrative methodological ex-
-
ploration. Certainly, the problem raised here is important whether the
quantitative estimates are close approximations or not.
APPnNDIX
Derivation of Quarterly Totals in1939Prices
1 FLOW OF GOODS TO CONSUMERS
The basic data are those of the Department of Commerce on con-
surners' outlay. The annual estimates of consumers' outlay in 1939
dollars are augmented by $3.1 billion, the prewar total of direct taxes.
The Department of Commerce adjustment for price changes con-
sists largely in reweighting the BLS prices of consumers' commodi-
ties and services. The over-all index differs little from the BLS cost
of living index.1 We attempted to improve the adjustment in two
ways: (a) for food and clothing, by comparing thc. 'deflated' totals
derived by the Department of Commerce with measures of the physi-
cal volume of commodity flow; (b) for services, by reweighting the
available price series.
a Food andClothing
For about 75 food items, representing more than 95 per cent by value
of all foods purchased by civilians, the Food Distribution Adminis-
tration has estimated the amount flowing into civilian channels, i.e.,
atter allowance for military takings and net exports. These items
were weighted by consumers' expenditures in 1941. Since no data are
available for 1939 we could not check for an upward bias in con-
sumers' expenditures in 1939-41. The weighted FDA estimates were
therefore linked to the estimate of deflated expenditures for 1941.
giving an estimate of expenditures in constant prices 4 and 9 per cent
lower than that of the Department of Commerce for 1942 and the
first half of 1943, respectively.
It is unlikely that inventory changes can account forany consider-
able part of these differences. The FDA consumption estimates allow
for inventory changes at the early stages of the distribution process,
and the rather sketchy data on retail inventories indicate no significant
'See Price Deflators for Consumer Commodities and Capital Equipment, 1929-42, by
Henry Shavell,SurveyofCurrent Business, May1943, pp. 13-21.
34S
amount of liquidation in either 1942 or the first halfof 1943. Nor
could a higher degree of fabrication account for an accelerated up-
ward movement in consumers' expenditures. Military andlend-lease
takings, heavily weighted with highly processed items, aresufficient
to explain the slightly greater employmentin the processing industries
in 1942 and 1943.
The price-adjusted totals for clothing could be checkedwith the
help of the FederaL Reserve Board index of the outputof clothing and
shoes for civilians; raw materials allocated to civilian output;military
takings; and man hours of employment in apparelindustries. The
consensus of these data indicates asubstantial overestimate in dollar
expenditures when adjusted by current price indexes forclothing and
shoes, of roughly 15 per cent in 1942 and thefirst half of 1943, even
after adjustment for discrepancies that mightbe attributed to a re-
duction in inventories.2
b Services
In studying price changes in the consumers' services area, wedivided
services into three groups: (i) those whose priceshave always been
closely regulated or have recently come undereffective control
utilities on the one hand, rents on the other;(ii) those whose prices
are still completelyuncontrolledrecreation and amusement, per-
sonal services, domestic service; (iii) service paymentsthat represent
charges under relatively fixed obligations such asinsurance premiums
and society dues. The Department of Commerceadjustment consists
in applying a price aggregate representingthe service components of
the BLS cost of living index, anddominated by regulated services.
which had a weight of two-thirds ascompared with a weight of less
than one-half in the service expenditureestimates (at current prices).
There is little reason to expect thatprice increases would be appre-
ciably less for uncontrolled services thanfor commodities, since the
same factors tend toinflate priceshigh consumer incomes,labor
shortages, rising costs ofoperationand are not restrained by price
ceilings. Similarly for the more orless fixed service payments, a gen-
eral correction for the purchasing powerof the dollar is in order. In
the minor item of contributions tocharity, the current dollar value
must be adjusted for changesin costs and in the real contentof the
disbursements made possible bysuch contributions.
2 Becauae of the confidential classification ofthe underlying data, the detailed calcula.
tions cannot be shown here.
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The adjustment for changes in the pricesof the services group con-
sists merely in reweighting the BLS serviceitems and applying the
indexes for the unregulated service itemsor the cost of living index
to the services classified under (ii) and (iii) above(App. Table 1).
The resultant price indexesmay still be considered low, partly because
of quality deterioration in suchcontrolled items as rent and trans.
portation, partly because the cost of living indexhas a downward bias
(for present uses).
APPENDIX TABLE 1
Price Indexes for Services, 1942-1943
Expenditures data from Department of Commerce;indexes from Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Regulated services index appliedto 'education and religion', 'free' service
index to balancing item, cost of livingindex to other components.
c Effect of Adjust,,jent, under (a) and (b)
Appendix Table 2 summarizes theeffect of the adjustments just de-
scribed on the estimates of flowto consumers (excluding direct taxes)
in 1939 prices. It is not quitevalid to interpret the adjustmentin the
food and clothing itemsas an adjustment of the price indexes alone.
In that sense the implicitprice index in line A-5 (and C-5)is too
high; and correspondingly theestimates in current dollars (linesA-i
and C-i) perhaps too high. Butsince it is impossible to apportionthe
adjustment, it was simpler and probablymore proper to attribute it to
the bias in price rather than incurrent dollar value indexes.
d Quarterly Totals
The quarterly serieson consumers' outlay, in 1939 prices, seasonally
unadjusted, is from the Departmentof Commerce. Each downward
adjustment for food, clothing, andtotal services for 1942 and the
first half of 1943 (describedunder (a) and (b) above),was inter-
polated by quarters with the help ofa free-hand curve. Subtraction of
these quarterly adjustments from thequarterly series gave a single
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Free 8,100 112.2 117.0 120.6 Regulated
Other areas
13,075 102.6 102.8 102.8
Education & religion 1,325 102.6 102.8 102.8 Other gifts & bequests 350 117.7 122.7 124.9
Employment expense & family business2,850 117.7 122.7 124.9 Balancing item
All
1,900 112.2 117.0 120.6 services 27,60(1 107.4 109.7 111.0series of quarterly estimates of consumers' outlay in1939prices which
was then corrected for seasonal variations by a simple indexbased
on ratios to a moving four-quarters average. This seasonalcorrection
seemed to yield better totals than the adjustment for separate com-
ponents made by the Department of Commerce.
APPENDIX TABLE 2
Revised Estimates of Flow of Goods to Consumers, 1939 Prices
Compared with the Department of Commerce Estimates









I Department of Commerce
1Total,current prices 54.4 60.8
2 Total, 1939 prices 43.4 45.2
" Implicit price index [(t2) x 1001 125.4 134.5
II Our Estimates
4 Total, 1939 prices 41.5 42.1
5 Implicit price index [(1+4) xlOo) 131.1 144.4
B Services
I Department of Commerce
1 Total, current prices 27.6 28.9
2 Total, 1939 prices 26.3 27.2
3 Implicit price index 104.9 106.3
II Our Estimates
4 Total, 1939 prices 25.7 26.2
5 Implicit price index 107.4 110.3
C Total (cxci. governmental services)
I Department of Commerce
1 Total, current prices 82.0 89.7
2 Total, 1939 prices 69.7 72.4
3 Implicit price index 117.6 123.9
II Our Estimates
4 Total, 1939 prices 67.2 68.3
5 Implicit price index 122.0 131.3
Depaitment of Commerce estimates in current prices from Survey ofCurrentBusiness,
Aug. 1943; estimates at 1939 prices provided by the Department.
a Gross
The two major components of this total are private grossand govern-
ment nonwar capital formation. Quarterly estimatesof the former,
in 1939 prices, are from the Department of Commerce.In this price
adjustment, the Department uses indexes of construction costs,prices
of capital equipment goods, prices of commodities(in connection
with the inventory changes), and so on. Themethods are briefly
37described in the Survey of Current Business, March1943 (notes to
Table 1, pp. 19-20).
To this series we added quarterly estimates ofnonwar government
construction, breaking down the annual totals on the basis ofseries
available at both the Department of Commerce and theWar Pro-
duction Board; and adjusting the current dollar valuesfor price
changes by the Department of Commerce index for itsConstruction
component of private gross capital formation. The resultwas a
quarterly, seasonally unadjusted, series ofgross nonwar capital
formation.
A simple seasonal correctionwas then applied separately to the
net inventory change and the other (largelyconstruction and ma-
chinery) components of the total. Theseasonal indexes were based
on either absolute or relative deviations froma moving four-quarters
average.
b Net
Net was derived fromgross by subtracting estimated depreciation
and depletion. The annualtotals of the latter, incurrent prices
(Table 1, line 9),were interpolated by quarters with the helpof a
free-hand curve. The adjustmentfor price changeswas then made by
an index derived from the Departmentof Commerce data for the
construction and durableequipment components of privategross
capital formation. Sincecurrent price changes are presumably damped
in the total values ofcapital goods subject to depreciationand deple-
tion, only one-half of theprice rise in the current pricesof construc- tion and equipmentwas allowed in the index used.
This procedure is crude.The proper method callsfor an adjust-
ment, first, of depreciation chargesfor the difference betweenoriginal
cost and reproduction valuebases; then fora more accurate measure-
ment of changes in reproductionvalues. Also, the quarterlyinterpo- lation is approximate.But in view of thedifficulties of aproper
translation of the depreciationestimates to a reproduction value base,
the small annual change,and the smallness ofthe item relative to the national producttotals, it did notseem advisable to attempt the
more laborious calculations.
3 wOUTLAY
The general schemeof derivingwar outlay in 1939 prices is indicated
in Appendix Table3; some of the underlyingdata are presented in
38S
Appendix Table 4. Because data on the components of war outlay
are confidential, no specific entries are shown inAppendix Table 3.
APPENDIX TABLE 3
Schematic Presentation of Derivation of War Outlay in 1939 Prices
1939, 1940, first half of 1941; then by quarters
1 Total war outlay, current dollars
2 Munitions & war COnSttuCtiOfl (varying % of line 1, averaging 25 since 1940)
3 Nonmunitions (line 1line 2)
4 Total costs, munitions & war construction
Labor(line2Xline S of App. Table 4)
Capital & enterprise (line 2Xline 6 of App. Table 4)
Taxes (line 2X line 7 of App. Table 4)
5 Price index for labor costs (see text)
6 Price index for capital & enterprise (line IG of App. Table 4)
7 Resource costs, 1939 prices
Labor (line 4a+ lineS)
Capital & enterprise (line 4bline 6)
Taxes (1939 ratio of line 3 to sum of lines I & 2 in App. Table 4, multiplied
by sum of line 7a & line 7b)
Total (line 7a+line 7b+ line 7c)
8 Price index for nonmunitions (see text)
9 Nonmunitions, 1939 prices (line 3- line 8)
10 War outlay, 1939 prices (line 7d + line 9)
Implicit Price Indexes
11 Taxes (line 4c+ line 7c)
12 Munitions & war construction (line 2line 7d)
13 Total war outlay (line Iline 10)
The adjustment of war outlay for price changes begins with a
breakdown into two parts, for which separate adjustment must be
made: (a) nonmunitions; (b) munitions plus war construction.With
quarterly data in current prices, which need no seasonaladjustment,
at hand, derivation of appropriate priceindexes leads directly to cal-
culating quarterly totals in 1939 prices. The sole remaining step
necessary to derive the proper componentfor national income (as
distinct from the component for gross nationalproduct) is (c) to
subtract quarterly estimates of depreciation on warconstruction, in
1939 prices.
a Nonrnunitions
These comprise military pay; civilian pay (waragencies); sub-
sistence; travel; clothing and personal equipment;agricultural ex-
ports; other nonmunitions. Apart from payitems, the group is made
up largely of consumer-typegoods, though in the case of clothing
subject to considerable modification to satisfy militaryrequirements.
Many of the items, indeed, are purchased off theshelf rather than
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8products would seem to warrant the application of wholesale price
indexes. These were selected from the BLS wholesale price series.
Both military and civilian pay were corrected for recent increases in
rates of pay.
The total price index for this category rises to about 115 by the
end of 1941; averages about 125 in 1942; and rises further to some-
what above 140 by the second quarter of 1943.
b Munitions and War Construction
in the deflation of munitions and war construction we are forced to
study the compensation of productive resources in order to measure
physical output. The conversion to 1939 prices was effected by the
separate deflation of the major components in the current price of
munitions output: labor costs and gross profits, the latter in turn
allocable between returns to capital and enterprise and corporate
income and excess profits tax. The weights assigned to these three
components of munitions output are determined by th breakdown of
gross output in the five industrial groups (oil, gas and metal mining,
chemicals and petroleum refining, metal fabrication, and contract
'construction) that accounted for the bulk of munitions production
and war construction in 1942 (see App. Table 4).
1) The price index for the labor factor was derived from a study
of changes in hourly earnings in war manufacturing industries. A
weighted index was constructed by dividing aggregate weekly wages
actually paid by aggregate weekly wages, assuming 1939 hourly
earnings throughout the period, in a group of 44 war industries
(using BLS employment and earnings series). This gave, ineffect,
an index of hourly earnings in these44 industries combined, using
current man hours as weights.8 Aggregate weekly wagesused in this
calculation were derived by multiplying the number of employees by
the average work week (in hours), then multiplyingthe product
(i.e., weekly man hours) by average hourly earnings.
The 44 metal, chemical, and rubber industriescovered in this cal-
culation, using the BLS designations and ranged inascending order of
percentage increase from 1939 to 1942 in averagehourly earnings,
follow.
8 Weighting this index of hourly earnings had almost noeffect. The weighted and the
unweighted indexes almost kept pace during 193942; thehigh wage industries had a




2 Rubber tires & inner tubes
3 Blast furnaces, steel works & rolling
mills
4 Tractors











14 Sewing machines, domestic &
industrial
15 Explosives & safety fuses
16 Fabricated structural & ornamental
metal work
17 Typewriters
18 Cash registers, adding & calculating
machines
19 Machinery & machine-shop products
21) Machine tools
21 Bolts, nuts, washers, rivets
ii) The current cost ofthe capital plus enterprise factorwas meas-
ured as the sum of corporate net income aftertaxes, depreciation.
entrepreneurial income, interest, and net rents and royalties. Toderive
a price index for this component, recent increases in the totalcost had
to be related to number of units of capital and enterprise. Sinceit is
diflicult to find an index of changes in the inputof capital and enter-
prise analogous to man hours of employment,we used an index
representing the consumption ofraw materials of mineral origin.4
4 Prepared at the National Bureau of EconomicResearch by G. H. Moore.Itis a
weighted index comprising nine metals and ten nonmetals:
METALS
Ferrous











22 Silver-ware & plated ware




26 Rubber goods, other
27 Agricultural machinery, cxci. tractors
28 Stamped & enameled ware &
galvanizing
29 Aircraft & parts, excl. aircraft engines
30 Steam & hot-water heating apparatus
& steam fittings
31 Cutlery & edge tools
32 Clocks & watches
33 Tools, excl. edge tools, machine tools,
files & saws
34 Aluminum
35 Car building, electric & steam railroad
36 Radios & phonographs
37 Forgings, iron & steel
38 Alloying & rolling & drawing
39 Ammunition, small arms
40 Shipbuilding
41 Engines & turbines

















It may reflect with a fair degree of accuracy the utilization of durable
capital in the war industries which are by and large the metal con-
suming industries in both war and peace; but is quite unrelated to the
enterprise or risk element of gross capital or to such elements of
management as are not included in labor incomes. The unit return to
capital and enterprise shows a net increase only slightly greater than
that shown by the unit return to labor. This is not believed to be
excessively large and may conceal a sizable downward bias.
iii) Corporate income and excess profits taxeshave increased
enormously since1939,particularly in the industries that have been
largely converted to war output. But the increase reflects the needs of
the government for more revenue in wartime rather than additional
services performed for corporate enterprises. It can of course be
argued that under wartime controls of production and distribution
the government has assumed most of the risk and many of the man-
agement functions of corporations, particularly of those producing
military equipment. But to the extent that this is true, the increase in
the real contribution of capital and enterprise is certainly overstated
in our estimates; and any allowance for an increase in the real value
of services represented by taxes would be compensated by a corre-
sponding reduction in the estimate of the real value of the services of
capital and enterprise. We therefore assumed that in1939corporate
taxes were the monetary equivalent of the federal government's con-
tribution to business activity; and that thereafter such services kept
pace with real output, i.e., with deflated labor andcapital costs. As
a result, corporate taxes have an implicit priceindex of nearly 700 in
1942 and are an important factor in raising the implicit index for all
war outlays for that year.
For both munitions and war construction and nonmunitions, the
attempt to get quarterly price indexes based on these detailedcaku-
lations did not seem warranted for the period before the third quarter
of 1941, partly because prices had changed so little since 1939, but
largely because the war outlay totals were so small. From 1939 to the
third quarter of 1941 annual data were, therefore, used and the
quarterly price indexes derived by graphic interpolation (App.
Table 5).
(Noie 4 coatd.)
Experiments with an index of somewhat different composition more closely related
to the five war industries (excluding coal and induding rubber, ethylalcohol, lumber)
yielded a similar index. Recalculation did not, therefore, seem warranted
43$
APPENDiX TABLE 5
Derivation of Quarterly War Outlays and Price Index
1939 to Second Quarter of 1941
(dollar figures in billions)
Cot. 1: From Department ofCommerce.
Cot. 2: By application to Cot.1 of annual and quarterly price indexesin Appendix Table 3.
Cot. 3: Col. 1Col. 2.
Cot. 4: Interpolated graphicallyon the basis of annual figures. Therewas no need to interpolate quarterly for1939 since the indicated quarterly indexeswere not sufficiently above or below ioo to affectthe current dollar gures in thefirst decimal place. Cot. 5: Combination of Cot.3 and 4.
Cot. 6: Cot. 2 when given; forall other periods (Cot. 1Col. 5) X 100.
c Depreciation on WarConstruction
The annual totals incurrent prices, based on the changingcost of war
construction (Table 1),were apportionJ by quarters in roughcorre
sponclence to the quarterlyvolumes of newwar construction (data
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1940 2.7 2.4 112 112 2.4
1 .4 103 103 4 11 j 108 108 .5 111 .6 110 115
IV 1.2 115 115 1.0
1941
1
12.5 9.8 128 128 9.8
II
1.9 120 120 1.6
III
2.5 124 124 2.0
IV
3.4 2.66 128 128 2.7 4.7 3.52 133 133 3j
1942 49.3 33.7 146 146 I
11
6.9 5.07 136 136 5.1
III
10.4 7.26 143 143 7.3
W




18.8 12.30 153 153 12.3 21.8 13.95 156 156 14.0S
prices of durable equipment used by the Department of Commerce
for the construction and equipment components of private gross cap-
ital formation. It undoubtedly understates the level ofcurrentcosts
of war construction relative to1939,but may approximate fairly well
the cbanging valuation level in the cumulative total of war construc-
tion subject to depreciation. In any event, in view of the necessarily
crude assumptions that have to be made with reference to the scope
of this category and the life period underlying the depreciation rate,
more laborious and specific procedures for price adjustment did not
seem warranted.
4 SUMMARY, SECTIONS 1-3
To summarize the price adjustments and quarterly interpolations
APPENDIX TABLE 6
National Product and Its Components, Wartime Concept
Quarterly, 1939-1943, Current Prices
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (61 (73
1939 64.8 13.2 6.0 1.4 1.4 79.4 72.2
I 63.5 12.4 5.3 1.2 1.2 77.1 70.0
11 64.1 11.6 4.4 1.3 1.3 '7.0 69.8
III 65.1 12.7 5.5 1.4 1.4 79.2 72.0
IV 663 16.2 8.9 1.5 1.5 84.0 76.7
1940 68.8 16.6 9.2 2.7 2.7 88.1 80.7
1 67.7 16.4 9.1 1.7 1.7 85.8 78.5
H 68.1 14.7 7.3 2.0 2.0 84.8 77.4
III 69.0 16.5 9.1 2.5 2.5 88.0 80.6
IV 70.3 18.8 11.3 4.7 4.6 93.8 86.2
1941 77.7 21.0 13.1 12.5 12.2 111.2 103.0
1 74.1 19.2 11.6 7.6 7.4 100.9 93.1
11 76.8 20.9 13.1 10.0 9.7 107.7 99.6
III 80.4 21.3 13.3 13.6 13.2 115.3 106.9
IV 79.5 22.3 14.1 18.8 18.3 120.6 111.9
1942 85.1 9.3 0.5 493 48.0 143.7 133.6
I 83.4 14.9 6.4 27.7 27.0 126.0 116.8
11 82.6 12.7 4.0 41.5 40.4 136.8 127.0
III 85.9 7.2-1.7 57.1 55.6 150.2 139.8
IV 88.5 2.1-6.9 70.9 69.1 161.5 150.7
1943 (1sthalf)92.8 0.1 9.1 81.0 78.9 173.7 162.6
1 93.3 0.2-8.8 75.0 73.0 168.5 157.5
II 923 -0.5-9.5 87.1 84.9 178.9 167.7I
described so far, Appendix Tables 6 and 7 bring together the esti-
mates of national product and its components, at current and 1939
prices.
APPENDIX TAISLE 7
National Product and Its Components, Wartime Concept, Quarterly, 1939-43
1939 Prices, Mixed Final Product and Resource-Input Levels
Owing to rounding quarterly totals may not add up exactly.
The seasonal adjustments used for this table are different from thuse used for Appendix
Table 6.
The seasonal adjustments applied to the totals incurrent prices are
those used by the Department of Commerce. The seasonal correction
of the components in 1939 prices is bya simple method, described
above, which yields amore acceptably smooth movement of the
totals. For this and otherreasons, one cannot derive quarterly implicit
price indexes by comparing quarterly entriesin the two tables. Com-
parison of the annual totals ismore legitimate, except that for flow
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7)
1939 64.8 13.2 6.0 1.4 1.4 79.4 72.2
1 62.8 12.0 4.9 1.2 1.2 76.0 68.9
11 65.2 11.3 4.1 1.3 13 77.8 70.6
III 64.8 12.9 5.7 1.4 1.4 79.1 71.9
IV 66.4 16.6 9.3 1.5 1.5 84.5 77.2
1940 68.2 16.4 9.0 2.4 2.4 87.0 79.6
1 66.5 16.3 9.1 1.7 1.7 84.5 77.3
II 67.7 15.7 8.3 2.0 2.0 85.4 78.0
III 68.5 16.7 9.3 2.0 2.0 87.2 79.8
IV 701 16.8 9.4 4.0 3.9 90.9 83.4
1941 73,1 19.5 11.9 9.8 9.5 102.4 94.5
1 70.9 19.2 11.7 6.4 6.2 96.5 88.8
II 74.1 21.4 13.8 8.0 7.7 103.5 95.6
111 74.9 19.9 12.2 10.6 10.2 105.4 97.3
IV 72.7 17.7 9.9 14.2 13.7 104.6 96.3
1942 70.2 8.3 0.0 34.0 32.9 112.5 103.1
1 70.7 14.0 6.0 20.2 19.6 104.9 96.3
II 68.7 13.6 5.4 29.6 28.6 111.9 102.7
III 69.9 5.6-2.7 38.4 37.1 113.9 104.3
IV 71.5 0.0-8.4 47.7 46.1 119.2 109.2
1943(litbalf)71.3 0.4 7.9 52.0 50.2 123.7 113.6
I 71.1 0.3-8.1 48.947.1 120.3 110.1
II 71.5 0.5-7.8 55.2 53.3 127.2 117.0
S
IIS
addition of direct taxes has been subtracted from Column 1(in
both tables).
The main difficulty with the results attained so far is thatthe
indexes used to measure price changes for goods includedunder flow
to consumers, nonwar capital formation,and the nonmunitions part
of war outlay, relate to final products; whereas those used to'deflate'
current dollar values of nmnitions and war constructionrelate to
resources. Thus, one part of the nationalproduct, when adjusted for
price changes, represents a sum of final products at their 1939prices;
the other is a sum of productive resources valued at their 1939prices.
The two parts, which were in fact added in Appendix Table 7, can
legitimately be added only by one of two further steps: eitherfinal
product totals have to be converted to totals of resource-input or
resource-input converted to final product output.
5 TRANSITION TO RESOURCE-INPUT
Except for scattered data on changes in physical output per manhour
for a few manufacturing and mining industries andutilities (pub-
lished chiefly hy the Bureau of Labor Statistics,Productivity and
Technological Development Division), there is no information on
changes in the efficiency of resources in productioninvolved in the
flow of goods to consumers, nonwar capital formation, orthe flow of
nonmunitions. But whatever data there are suggest thatthe gain in
productivity since 1939 has been moderate, not more than2 or 3
per cent per year; that itvirtually ceased by 1942; and that in recent
quarters, as the scale of operations in manycivilian industries declined
and dilution of labor and other resources tookplace, efficiency per
resource unit may have declinedslightly.
The index in Column I of AppendixTable 8 is an unwarrantedly
precise quantitative expression of theseimpressions: it is intended to
be illustrative rather than substantive. It isapplied uniformly to the
three major components in nationalproduct which in Appendix
Table 7 are measured at 1939 final productprices: consumers' outlay;
nonwar construction andequipment; nonmunitions. Instead of con-
verting the price indexes used forAppendix Table 7 into indexes of
resource prices, then usingthe latter to adjust the current dollarvalue
totals in Appendix Table 6, wecalculated directly the adjustments
that would have to be made in thetotals in Appendix Table 7 in
order to get the results of correcting currentdollar values by indexes
of compensation of resources.
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APPENDiX TABLE 8
Calculation of Adjustments in Appendix Table 7 for
Translating Totals to Resource-Input Levels, 1939 Prices
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
Col. 1: assumed, see text.
Cot. 2: Col. 1 of Appendix Table 7 minus direct taxes.
Cot. 3: Col. 2-100 (Col. 2/Col. 1).
Col. 4: Department of Commerce data.
Col. 5: CoI.4- 100 (Col. 4/Col. 1).
Col. 6: Cot. 4 of Appendix Table 7 multiplied by 0.3.
Col. 7: Cal. 6- 100 (Col. 6/Col. I).
The adjustment yields new totals of national product andits com-
ponents (App. Table 9). The meaning of these estimates should be
kept clearly in mmd: theygauge the volume of resource-input at their
prices (i.e., their relative efficiency levels) in1939 on the assumption
that resources used in munitions andwar construction are comparable
in relative efficiency with those utilized in thefive 'war' industries in
1939. This assumption is especially important, sinceunless we make
it we catmot add munitions andconstruction, adjusted by indexes of
resource prices in the five 'war' industries, to otherparts of national




YEAI (exci.) AD). CONSThUC-AD). ASSUMED AD).
MID EFFICIENcY gay. IN UON * IN NONMU. IN
QUARTER INDEX sen-ice,)(2) EQUIPMENT(4) NITIO..S 16)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6) (7)
1939 100.0 61.7 0.0 11.4 0.0
99.1 59.7 +0.5 11.1 4-0.1
11 99.7 62.1 +0.2 11.2 0.0 No
lit 100.3 61.7 -0.2 11.3 0.0
IV 100.9 63.3 -0.6 12.1-0.1 adjustment
1940 102.5 65.1-1.6 13.0-0.4 through
1 101.5 63.4-09 12.1 -0.2
11 102.2 64.6 -1.4 12.6-0.3 1940
III 102.8 65.4 -1.8 13.1 -0.4
1V 103.4 67.0 -2.2 14.0 -0.5
1941 104.8 70.0 -3.2 15.3 -0.7 2.9 -0.2
1 104.0 67.8 -2.6 15.4-0.6 1.9-oj
II 104.6 71.0 --3.1 16.2-0.7 2.4 -0.1
Iii 105.1 71.8 -3.5 14.7-0.7 3.2 -0.2
1V 1055 69.6-3.6 15.0-0.8 4.3 -0.3
1942 105.1 67.1 -3.3 8.3-0.4 10.2 -0.5
1 105.3 67.6 -3.4 11.3-0.6 6.1 -0.3
ii 105.1 65.6-3.2 9.5-05 8.9 -0.4
III 105.0 66.8-3.2 7.0-0.3 11.5 -0.6
IV 105.0 68.4-3.2 5.3-0.3 14.3 -0.7
1943 (Isi half) 105.0 68.2-3.2 3.8-0.2 15.6 -0.7
1 105.0 680-3.2 4.2-0.2 14.7 -0.7
11 105.0 68.4-3.2 3.5-0.2 16.6 -0.8APPENDIX TABLE 9
National Product and Its Components, Wartime Concept
Quarterly, 1939-1943, 1939 Prices, Resource-Input Levels
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
Cot. 1: Col. 1 of Appendix Table 7 pius adjustments in Col. 3 of Appendix Table 8.
Col. 2, 3: Cot. 2 and 3 of Appendix Table 7 pius adjustments in Cot. 5 of Appendix
Table 8.
Col. 4, 5: Cot. 4 and 5 of Appendix Table 7 p/its adjustments in Cot. 7 of Appendix
Table 8.
6 TRANSITION TO FINAL PRODUCTS
The three assumptions concerning the relative efficiency of the use
of resources in munitions production and war construction are set
forth in the text. Appendix Table 10 shows a sample calculation
based on assumption a. The quarterly index in Column 1 is by graphic
interpolation to annual totals, which allows for a two-thirds rise of
the index from 1939 to the first half of 1943, some retardation in the
relative rise from the third quarter of 1941 to the second quarter of















(1+2+4) (I+1+) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1939 64.8 13.2 6.0 1.4 1.4 79.4 72.2
1 63.3 12.1 5.0 1.2 1.2 76.6 69.5
II 65.4 11.3 4.1 1.3 1.3 78.0 70.8
111 64.6 12.9 5.7 1.4 1.4 78.9 71.7 lv 65.8 16.5 9.2 1.5 1.5 83-8 76.5
1940 66.6 16.0 8.6 2.4 2.4 85.0 77.6
1 65.6 16.1 8.9 1.7 1.7 83.4 76.2
II 66.3 15.4 8.0 2.0 2.0 83.7 76.3
111 66.7 16.3 8.9 2.0 2.0 85.0 77.6
IV 67.9 16.3 8.9 4.0 3.9 88.2 80.7
194) 69.9 18.8 11.2 9.6 9.3 98.3 90.4
I 68.3 18.6 11.1 6.3 6.1 93.2 85.5
II 71.0 20.7 13.1 7.9 7.6 99.6 91.7
III 71.4 19.2 11.5 10.4 10.0 101.0 92.9
IV 69.1 16.9 9.1 13.9 13.4 99.9 91.6
1942 66.9 7.9-0.3 33.5 32.4 108.3 99.0
1 67.3 13.4 5.4 19.9 19.3 100.6 92.0
II 65.5 13.1 4.9 29.2 28.2 107.8 98.6
III 66.7 5.3 3.0 37.8 36.5 109.8 100.2
IV 68.3 -0.3-8.7 47.0 45.4 115.0 105.0
1943 (isihalf)68.1 0.2-8.1 51.3 49.5 119.6 109.5
1 67.9 0.1-8.3 48.2 46.4 116.2 106.0
II 68.3 0.3-8.0 54.4 52.5 123.0 112.8APPENDIX TABLE 10
Sample Calculation of War Outlay as a Final Product Component
Quarterly, 1939-1943
Assumption a
(dollarIgures inbillions, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
Col. I and 2: assumed, see text. Annual entriesare direct averages of quarterly.
Col. 3: (Cal. 1 XQ.75) + (Cd. 2 X0.25). Annualentries: 100 (Cal. 5+Col. 4).
Col. 4: From Appendix Table 9, Col. 4.
Col. 6: From Appendix Table 6, Col. 4.
Col. 7: Underlying calculation in Col.5 carried to two decimal places.
The weights of the indexes inColumns 1 and 2 are basedon the
approximate proportions of thetwo components of war outlay (in
1939 prices in App. Table 9). Theweights are held constant, since
otherwise the proportion ofnonmunitions in total war outlay could
be calculated. But ingeneral, variations in theproportions are rela-
tively minor in quarterly totalsin recent years.






EFFICIENCY OF RESOURCES RESOURCE WAR IMPLICIT
YEAR UNITS WAR OUTLAY ASOUTLAY PRICE













2939 48 100 61 1.35 0.8 1.35 163
I 48 99 61 1.2 0.7
11 48 100 61 1.3 0.8
III 48 100 61 1.4 0.8
IV 49 101 62 1.5 0.9
1940 51 102 64 2.42 1.6 2.72 175
1 50 101 63 1.7 1.1
11 51 102 64 2.0 1.3
III 51 103 64 2.0 1.3
IV 52 103 65 4.0 2.6
194! 56 105 68.5 9.62 6.6 12.50 188
54 104665 6.3 4.2
Ii 55 105 67.5 7.9 5.3
111 57 105 69 10.4 7.2
IV 59 106 71 13.9 9.9
1942 67 105 76.5 33.47 26.0 49.30 190
1 61 105 72 19.9 14.3
11 64 105 74 29.2 21.6
III 69 105 78 37.8 29.5 N 74 105 82 47.0 38.5
1943 (lithaIf)80 105 86.5 51.30 44.4 81.05 182
1 78 10585 48.2 41.0
11 82 105 88 54.4 47.9corresponding to the assumed relative efficiency of resources in muni-
tions and war construction. They are obviously not relatives of actual
prices in terms of 1939 as 100.
No quarterly entries are shown in Column 7 largely because the
quarterly series in Column 6 was subjected to a different seasonal
adjustment than the series upon which Columns 4 and 5 are based.
As a result, the quarterly entEies in Column 7, if derived directly,
would fluctuate erratically. It seemed unnecessary to make the minor
adjustments, although they are easy and an implicit quarterly price
index can be derived.
APPENDiX TABLE 11
War Outlay as a Final Product Component, Quarterly, 1939-194 3
Assumptions b and c
(dollar ligures in billions, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
See notes to Appendix Table 10. Col. 1 and 4 in this table correspond to Col. 3 in
Appendix Table 10; Col. 2 and 5 to Col. 5 of Appendix Table 10; Col. 3 and 6 to





























1939 72 1.0 138 84 1.1 119
I 72 0.9 83 1.0
II 72 0.9 83.5 1.1
III 72 1.0 83.5 1.2
IV 73 1.1 84.5 1.3
1940 76 1.8 148 89 2.2 126
I 74 1.3 86 1.5
II 75 1.5 88 1.8
Ill 76 1.5 89.5 1.8
IV 79.5 3.1 91 3.6
1941 82 7.9 158 96 9.5 134
I 79 5.0 93 5.9
II 81 6.4 95 7.5
III 82.5 8.6 97.5 10.1
N 85 11.8 100 13.9
1942 92 31.2 158 109 37.0 133
I 87 17.3 103 20.5
II 89 26.0 106 30.95
III 94 35.5 111 42.0
IV 98 46.1 116 54.5
1943 (Iii half) 105 54.0 150 124 63.8 127
I 103 49.6 121.5 58.6
H 107 583 127 69.1Appendix Table 11 presents the more important stepsin the cal-
culations based upon assumptions b and c. Thequarterly interpolation
of the efficiency indexes, as well as the movementof the annual totals,
was established along lines similar tothose adopted in the cakula-
tions based upon assumption a. This was inaccord with the basic
decision to vary the three assumptions only with respect tothe levels
of relative efficiency set for the first half of 1943,but to make them
the same with respect to the relative movementof the efficiency level
from 1939 to 1943.
APPENDIX TABLE 12
Gross and Net National Product, Wartime Concept, Quarterly, 1939-1943
1939 Final Product Prices
Three Assumptions concerning the Relative Efficiency of Resources
in Munitions and War Construction
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
Col. 1: Sum of Cot. 1 and 2, Appendix Table 7, and Col. 5, Appendix Table 10.
Col. 2 and 3: Sum of Cot. 1 and 2. Appendix Table 7, and Col. 2 and 5, Appendix
Table 11.
Col. 4, 5, 6: Correspond fo Col. 1, 2, 3 after deduction o depreciation and depletion on
both nonwar capital formation and war construction (see App. Table 7).
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YEAR GROSS NATIONAL PROOUCr NET NATIONAL PRODUCT
AND UNDER ASSUMPTION UNDER ASSUMPTION
QUARTER b c a b c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1939 78.8 79.0 79.1 71.6 71.8 71.9
I 755 75.7 75.8 68.4 68.6 68.7
II 77.3 77.4 77.6 70.1 70.2 70.4
Ill 78.5 78.7 78.9 71.3 71.5 71.7
IV 83.9 84.1 84.3 76.6 76.8 77.0
1940 86.2 86.4 86.8 78.8 79.0 79.4
1 83.9 84.1 84.3 76.7 76.9 77.1
II 84.7 84.9 85.2 77.3 77.5 77.8
Ill 8.5 86.7 87.0 79.1 79.3 79.6
IV 89.5 90.0 90.5 82.0 82.5 83.0
1941 99.3 100.6 102.0 913 92.6 94.1
I 94.3 95.1 96.0 86.6 87.4 88.3
II 100.8 101.9 103.0 92.9 94.0 95.1
III 102.0 103.4 104.9 93.9 95.3 96.8
IV 100.3 102.2 104.3 92.0 93.9 96.0
1942 104.5 109.7 115.5 95.2 100.4 106.2
I 99.0 102.0 105.2 90.3 93.4 96.6
II 103.9 108.3 113.25 94.7 99.1 104.1
III 105.0 111.0 117.5 95.4 101.4 107.9
IV 110.0 117.6 126.0 100.0 107.6 116.0
1943(ii: half) 116.1 125.7 135.5 105.9 115.5 125.3
1 112.4 121.0 130.0 102.2 110.8 119.8
11 119.9 130.3 141.1 109.7 120.1 130.9The addition of war outlay, in temis of final output in accordance
with the three assumptions, to flow of goods to consumers andnon-
war capital formation, as derived in Appendix Table 7, yields three
series of national product totals corresponding to the final products
approath (App. Table 12).
In deriving national income or net national product totals (as dis-
tinct from gross national product), depreciation on war construction,
as already calculated in Appendix Table 7, is subtracted from gross
war outlay. By basing this item on the share of gross war outlay, we
APPENDaX TLE 13
Gross and Net National Product, Wartime Concept, Quarterly, 1939-1943
1939 Final Product Prices
Disregarding the Relative Efficiency of the Use of Resources
in Munitions and War Construction
(dollar figures in billions, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
Col. I derived from Appendix Tables 10, 11, and 12; Col. 2 and 3, by applying index
in Col. 1 to current dollar value totaJs (App. Table 6); Col. 4 and 5, by adding Col. 2




AND FOE WAI OUTLAY WAI OUTLAY NATIONAL PEODUCT
QIJ*.1U& (1939= 100) G,oss Nel Grass Net
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
7939 100 1.4 1.4 79.4 72.2
1 98 1.2 1.2 76.0 689
11 99 1.3 1.3 77.8 70.6
111 101 1.4 1.4 79.1 71.9
IV 102 1.5 1.5 843 77.2
7940 107 2.5 2.5 87.1 79.7
1 104 1.6 1.6 84.3 77.1
II 106 1.9 1.9 85.3 77.9
III 108 2.3 2.3 87.5 80.1
N 110 4.3 4.2 91.2 83.7
1941 114 10.9 10.6 103.6 95.6
I 112 6.8 6.6 96.9 89.2
II 114 8.8 8.5 104.3 96.4
III 115 11.9 11.5 106.7 98.6
N 116 16.2 15.8 106.6 98.4
1942 114 43.3 42.1 121.8 112.4
1 116 23.9 233 108.6 100.0
II 116 35.8 34.8 118.1 108.9
III 114 50.1 48.8 125.6 116.0
IV 112 63.3 61.7 134.8 124.9
1943 (lii baif) 109 74.4 72.5 146.1 135.9
I 110 68.2 66.4 139.6 129.4
II 108 80.6 78.6 152.6 142.31
S
could recalculate it in terms of final output as shown in Appendix
Table 12, represented by war construction (as distinct from muni-
tions). But it is not clear that the results would be a better approxi-
mation than the estimates used in Appendix Table 7; and in view of
the necessarily arbitrary character of the underlying assumption as to
length of life, recalculation seemed unwarranted.
Under the three assumptions, the implicit final product prices for
munitions and war construction (and hence for war outlay) are not
relatives in terms of 1939 as 100. They could not be unless we dis-
regarded differences in the relative efficiency of the use of resources
in war production as compared with that in similar industries in
peacetime. One may, therefore, ask what the temporal changes in
final product prices of war outlay are, if relative efficiency is dis-
regarded, and what the totals of war outlay and national product
would be if adjusted for such price changes over time alone.
Appendix Table 13, Column 1, provides the key price index,
derived from annual entries, which are in turn averages of the im-
plicit price indexes in war outlay under the three assumptions in terms
of 1939 as 100. These annual indexes are interpolated quarterly,
largely again on the basis of the implicit quarterly price indexes under
the three assumptions of Appendix Tables 10 and 11, smoothed to
eliminate erratic fluctuations. The other columns in Appendix Table
13 are a matter of straightforward calculation from Column 1.
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